NOTES by unknown
NOTES
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN REVOLTS AGAINST
LABOR UNION LEADERS
COURTS have been intervening with increasing frequency in situations where
labor unionists seek to free themselves of allegedly oppressive leadership.
In previous discussions this problem has been analyzed principally from the
viewpoint of the doctrines which the courts employ ;' but the value of such
analyses is limited, because traditional legal doctrines have little relevance to
the problems of intra-union conflict. If judges remain ignorant of the facts,
litigation will be inconclusive and wasteful; the source of conflict will con-
tinue, unresolved. A few of the difficulties are indicated by three case his-
tories chosen from a pathological industry.
The industry which constructs New York's magnificent buildings is itself
petty and chaotic. The persistence of handicraft methods has preserved high
costs of materials and labor, whose suppliers have long conspired to main-
tain inefficiency. The unions have gained critical power over employers by
controlling the supply of skilled workers, and thus have been able to threaten
the time-costs to which builders are especially subservient. This power was
used to fix wage rates at high levels, and these rates were protected by
freezing construction techniques in their old patterns. But such a program
involved long-range fallacies. Fixed costs aggravated the speculative trends
of the industry; high wages were overbalanced by uncertain length of jobs;
permanent relations with employers were made impossible. With builders
and workers vitally interdependent but mutually undependable, union officers,
standing between them, have been able to exploit both sides notoriously,
without disturbing the equanimity of the A. F. of L.
Of those intra-union disputes which reach the courts, most arise
as suits for injunction against proposed disciplinary measures, or for
mandamus for reinstatement after expulsion; and occasionally requests for
damages are joined. As a general policy, the courts refuse to intervene in
intra-union disputes except under one of two broadly-defined conditions :2
(a) the union charter-a contract between member and member, or member
and organization-has been breached; (b) a property' right is threatened,
such as the "right to work", the right to maintain union membership, or a
claim to special-benefit or general funds. Moreover, resort to internal union
processes for redress must have been exhausted or shown to be futile. In
other cases, concepts of tort (i.e., malice and conspiracy), agency (to define
the officers' duties), or due process of law (as a general test for the fairness
of internal procedures) have also been relied on. Since a few of these ra-
1. See for example Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1248; Note (1941) 51 YALE
L. J. 331; compare Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1244.
2. An extensive list of cases is collected in Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1248.
See generally Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit (1930) 43
HARv. L. REv. 993. The conceptual difficulties in various rationales are reviewed in Note
(1941) 51 YALE L. J. 331.
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tionales were transplanted bodily from the field of labor-capital conflict, it
is not surprising that they have served as occasions for generalized anti-union
sermons by the courts. Whether these doctrines help in solving real problems
should appear from the case histories.
CASa 1E
During the late 1920's and early 1930's racketeers controlled both contract-
ors and unions in the building trades of northern New Jersey, until scandal,
depression and the loss of Mayor Hague's support intervened. One of the first
revolts against that control was the attack by the (structural) Ironworkers
against the card-index system of allocating men to jobs. While the primary
objective of the card-index is to ensure impartiality and the unhampered
role of chance in job distribution, it can be easily manipulated by union
officers. The index had been adopted by Newark Local 11 in 1927-28 in an
unsuccessful effort to end the abuses of a former permit system. In May,
1929, Local 11 voted 309 to 4 to abolish the index, but its spokesmen were
denied a hearing by the north-Jersey District Council, whose constitution
required the system. Three locals besides the Newark one comprised the
Council: one of these (Perth Amboy Local 373) favored abolition, but the
second was unaffected by the system and therefore uninterested, while the
third was wholly dominated by the racketeers. Relief being blocked by the split
vote, friction mounted within Local 11. In the spring of 1930 a member
was criminally assaulted for protesting against manipulation of the card-
index ;4 at about the same time a petition against the system went to Inter-
national President Morrin, who ignored it. The explosion occurred in Sep-
tember and October of that year, when the Local voted out for 90-day
periods both the permit and the index systems. The International replied to
this action by ordering them both restored and by suspending local meetings
for a period which lasted some thirty months. Thus matters stood when
four of the dissentients in Local 11 invoked judicial aid.
In the resulting case, W~alsche v. Sherlock,5 the astonished tone of Vice-
Chancellor Berry's opinion reflects the court's inability to believe that such
unseemly methods were actually being used, and also its distaste for the arro-
gance of the International's officers. 6 The Vice-Chancellor, convinced of the
futility of making the plaintiffs "exhaust internal remedies", resolved the
principal question as a "purely legal" one. The card-index system was held to
be illegal because it was an instrument through which Local 11 maintained its
closed shop, which was held to be illegal per se. Consequently the local char-
ter, so far as its index provisions were concerned, became an unenforceable
3. See generally SEiDmAx, LAmoR CZARS (193S) 149-156. All the facts are in the
opinions cited, unless otherwiqse indicated.
4. See WValsche v. Sherlock, 110 N. J. Eq. 223, 238, 159 At. 661, 667-66S (Ch. 1932).
The prosecution for this assault is reported in State v. Flynn, 108 N. J. L. 19, 156 Adt.
117 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
5. 110 N. J. Eq. 223, 159 At. 661 (Ch. 1932).
6. When, in open court, plaintiffs' counsel offered to settle if the Local were per-
ntted to decide the index question for itself, defendants' counsel on instructions dis-
missed the offer as absurd.
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contract. The decree therefore restrained the union's officers from depriv-
ing the complainants of any membership rights whatever, as a penalty for
refusing to work under the index.
In Local 11 v. McKee 7 the dissentients went a step further and charged the
officers with having violated the Local's constitution in two ways: by acqui-
escing in the suspension of meetings, and by spending large sums of money
without membership approval. In his reports to the Union, International
President Morrin claimed that his vigorous intervention in the Local's af-
fairs had been made necessary by the dangers of radical-fomented dissen-
sion. In view, however, of the charges of malfeasance and of the steady
dwindling of the union's membership and money, the court appointed a1 re-
ceiver to preserve the Local's status quo until new officers should be elected.
"It is not difficult to perceive," said the court, "that the recreant ones should
be ousted from the positions of trust which they have violated, and others be
appointed in their stead."'8 But the membership of Local 11 disagreed, and
in a thoroughly honest election the old officers were re-elected. Apparently
the dissatisfaction of a small group of union men was not enough to over-
come the rank and file's deeply-rooted distrust of courts and their loyalty
for elected officers, even those suspected of having taken personal advantage
of a position of trust.
The same International and a sister Local in Perth Amboy are involved
in Local 373 v. International Association of Ironworkers.1t In 1930 one
Kelly had been elected business agent of 373 for a ten-year period; and when
at the election the following year the Local's members nominated one Buck-
ley for the same office, Kelly objected and appealed to the International for
aid. Though Kelly's appeal was sustained, the Local nevertheless renominated
and elected Buckley. A week later International Vice-President Pope was
directed to take supervision over 373 until its internal dissension should sub-
side. But as soon as he tried to put these orders into effect, the Local's of-
ficers, without troubling to appeal to the General Executive Board, served
him with an injunction which restrained all International interference in the
Local's affairs and finances." While the International then ceased to inter-
fere officially, in fact it continued to exercise a degree of control by recog-
nizing as Secretary-Treasurer Reichardt, who had originally been elected but
had later been divested of office by the Local. Since International dues-stamps
could be procured from Reichardt alone, the Local's own man never actually
came into power.12 In April, 1933, Reichardt revealed to the International
that since July, 1931, he had embezzled about $21,000;13 but the International
allowed him to remain in office until a receiver pendente lite was finally ap-
pointed by a court in July, 1933. The International not only refused to sup.
ply dues-stamps to the receiver, but in October, 1933, induced four of the
7. 114 N. J. Eq. 555, 169 At. 351 (Cb. 1933).
8. Id. at 566, 169 AtI. at 356.
9. Personal interview with counsel for plaintiffs.
10. 120 N. J. Eq. 220, 184 Atl. 531 (1936).
11. See id., brief for appellants, 3-6.
12. See id., brief for respondents, 13.
13. Reichardt was convicted for this embezzlement. See id. at 226, 184 Atl. at 534.
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Local's members to pay dues to itself directly and granted stamps to them
only, in the hope that other members-unable otherwise to prove union
standing--would follow. This policy was continued until trial time in 1936,
in such a way as to confuse the books further and deprive the Local of its
proper share of the dues-moneys paid. In his opinion Vice-Chancellor Bu-
chanan, apparently influenced by the decisions in JWaische v. Sherlock' and
Local 11 v. McKee,'5 recognized readily the impossibility of successful in-
ternal appeal. Since he could find no constitutional authority for the Inter-
national's acts, he restrained it from interfering in any way with the Local's
affairs, forbade it to discriminate as to dues-stamp recipients, and burdened
it with costs of receivership and litigation. But the court denied the two most
drastic requests made by the Local. The International was not enjoined from
chartering a new local in the Perth Amboy area, and the parent body was not
held answerable for Reichardt's defalcation, though a money decree against
Reichardt was granted. Inasmuch as an injunction had been restraining
the International from interfering with the Local's affairs during the period
of embezzlement, it was held that Reichardt could not then have been acting as
its agent; and the evidence of unofficial control by the International was not
thought sufficient to make the doctrine of "respondeat superio~r" apply.10
But the International was thus forced out of Local 373's affairs, and it seems
not to have interfered since then.
CASE II
A ten-year court history of attempts by New York's crane- and steam-
shovel-operators to get rid of their corrupt leaders begins with hope but ends
in futility."' Early in 1930, the two Locals that represented the International
Operating Engineers in New York were under the "supervisiun" of men
directly responsible to the General President. In that year President Huddell
decided that efficiency would be promoted by the suspension of local meet-
ings and a full concentration of power into the supervisors' hands.$5 Meet-
ings stopped; summary expulsion greeted those members who dared to pro-
test, including some of long standing in the Locals. When they brought
their plea to the Supreme Court in Rodier v. Huddell, 1 the failure to grant
a trial before expelling these members was held to have violated the Inter-
national constitution and to have deprived them, without due process, of their
property interests in local death benefits and general funds. The court there-
14. 110 N. J. Eq. 223, 159 Ad. 661 (Ch. 1932).
15. 114 N. 3. Eq. 555, 169 AUt. 351 (Ch. 1933).
16. Compare Toner v. Int'l Ass'n of Ironworkers, 113 N. J. L. 29, 172 At. 3S9
(1934). There the Ironworkers' International had taken legitimate supervision of the
Trenton local and had appointed Toner as its business agent. Although Toner received
his salary from the local, and although the International had no right to appoint local
officers, Toner's widow wvas permitted to recover against the International for her hus-
band's accidental death, on the theory that the International's control over Toner created
a master and servant relationship.
17. See generally SmDmAx, LABOR CzARs (1938) 156-165.
18. See testimony quoted in the first Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 859-S62, 257 ..
Y. Supp. 597, 602-604 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
19. 232 App. Div. 531, 250 N. Y. Supp. 336 (1st Dep't 1931).
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fore ordered that the expelled members be reinstated in Local 125. This
new Local 125 had been created by Huddell in the interim, by amalgamating
the two original Locals; and under Huddell's new supervisor, Patrick Com-
merford, the policy of membership exploitation was continued more vigor-
ously than ever, until Commerford was sent to Atlanta for income-tax eva-
sion late in 1932.20 At the instance of a rank-and-file leader named Irwin,
a group of members again sought judicial aid (in the first Irivin v. Possehl),21
and again succeeded. Relief within the parent organization was no more to
be expected from Possehl, the new General President, than from Huddell,
who had recently been murdered. In this situation Supreme Court Justice
Hammer took jurisdiction to construe the International constitution. In his
opinion supervisory powers were limited to investigating local officers and
affairs and guiding them back into compliance with the charter when they had
erred. Inasmuch as Commerford and his men had exceeded this authority,
Judge Hammer removed them from power and ordered elections and an ac-
counting to be held. This was June 2, 1932. On June 3 the General Execu-
tive Committee revoked 125's charter and promptly set up a rival local, whose
leaders asserted full jurisdiction for New York on the ground that 125 was
now out of both the International and the A. F. of L. In the second Irwin v.
Possehl22 the revocation of Local 125's charter was -nullified, thus putting it
stop to the other Local's claims. Yet a further suit by Local 125,23 request-
ing that the International's "ad hoc" union be dissolved, failed. When
this rival Local had already replaced itself by two more newer Locals, an-
other Supreme Court Justice enjoined it from continuing in existence ;24 yet
he refused to act against its offspring, whose officers, appointees of Possehl,
constituted the present danger to 125. When the officers of Local 125 begatl
an appeal from this extraordinary decision, they received formal notice from
Possehl, 25 were heard by him, adjudged guilty of incompetence and negli-
gence, and suspended from office (not from membership)-all in strict accord
with the International constitution. They resisted the General President's
orders, but at this crucial point of their revolt the rebels permanently lost
judicial support.
In Fay v. Robinson26 the insurgent officers, after attempting to show cause
why they should be permitted to disobey Possehl, were enjoined from fur-
ther resistance. Possehl then fortified his position by re-consolidating all the
locals into a single unit.27 A new constitution, whose terms expanded the
20. See United States v. Commerford, 64 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. de-
nied, 289 U. S. 759 (1933).
21. 143 Misc. 855, 257 N. Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
22. 145 Misc. 907, 261 N. Y. Supp. 164 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
23. McGrath v. Dillon, 145 Misc. 912, 262 N. Y. Supp. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
24. Unreported decision, N. Y. Sup. Ct., 1933 (Cohen, J.), quoted in plaintiff's
memorandum in Rowan v. Possehl, 173 Misc. 898, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 574 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
25. On Feb. 17, 1936.
26. 251 App. Div. 803, 287 N. Y. Supp. 326 (1936), modified vien., 277 N. Y. 610,
14 N. E. (2d) 187 (1938).
27. A complaint against this move was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See memo-
randa for both sides in Rowan v. Possehl, 173 Misc. 898, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 574 (Sup. Ct.
1940) ; and see Rodier v. Fay, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 744 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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President's control over disfavored Locals, was approved by the International
Convention later in 1938; and early in the next year these provisions were sub-
mitted (as required) to a nation-wide referendum. In Rowan -.. Possehl-0 -
members of the big new Local charged that response had been so wholeheart-
edly favorable as to warrant suspicion: in certain Locals cveryv registered mem-
ber had voted, and all, or practically all, had voted "aye"; in others there had
been voting by mail, although the General Executive Committee had instruct-
ed that only ballots be used. Doubt was thus cast on the validity of at least
one-third the total of votes. However, justice Benvenga found nothing in
the constitution to prevent Locals from voting in manners other than the one
prescribed, and--despite a detailed recounting of the unions' past-he dis-
covered that their acts bore a presumption of regularity. The evidence there-
fore fell short of proving a conspiracy. Since this mishap occurred, the New
York Local's engineers have made no new effort to rebel; but one may pre-
dict with little temerity that the struggle will break into the open again before
long.
CASE III
The International Hodcarriers Union comprises skilled and unskilled work-
ers in all branches of masonry construction, and a few experts in Realpolitik.
Although the organization has been under control-by-violence since 1911, only
two uprisings against it have occurred in the New York area, both recent and
both successful in the courts.
In accord with the domineering policy he has pursued since 1926, when
he inherited the International, in April of 1939 President Moreschi instructed
his appointee, Vice-President Bove, to take over the tunnel-workers' (Sand-
hogs') Local 147 of New York, without benefit of charges or hearing. When
the Local proved recalcitrant, Moreschi renewed his orders and instructed
147's deposit banks to honor no signature but Bove's. In Gallagher v. Mores-
chi29 the Local secured an injunction against these summary proceedings; but
the parent body was granted the right to investigate and try Local 147 on
charges. At this point Moreschi began a campaign to dissuade contractors
from dealing with the refractory Local, in an attempt to drive its members
into two new Locals sponsored by the International. Yet Local 147 remained
strong enough to lead the clamor which resulted in the holding of the first In-
ternational Convention in thirty years. The insurgents carried the fight to the
floor of the convention, but the organization's forces proved too well rooted.
President Green of the A. F. of L. appeared and praised the International
officials for cooperating with him. Moreshi won out by (literally) a stam-
pede, and, after his victory, said of his critics: "Christ said, 'Forgive them,
for they know not what they do.' So do I. ' 3o
28. 173 Misc. 898, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 574 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
29. Unreported decisions, N. Y. Sup. Ct. Temporary injunction granted June 23,
1939; permanent injunction, July 12, 1941.
30. See PM, Sept. 18, 1941, p. 20, col. 1. On Green's speecl, see N. Y. Times,
Sept 17, 1941, p. 14, col. 3. For the convention, see also: N. Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1941,
p. 11, col. 1; Sept. 16, 1941, p.30, col.4; Sept. 19, 1941, p.48, col.3; Sept. 20, 1941, p.
8, col. 8; and see also PM, Sept. 15, 1941, p. 20, col. 1; Sept. 16, 1941, p. 21, col. 1;
Sept. 21, 1941, p. 15, col. 2.
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It was now quite safe to prefer formal charges against 147. After six
weeks' hearing and deliberation by the International Executive Board (of
which Bove was a member), in January, 1942, the Local's officers were de-
clared guilty of having violated the constitution. As a penalty the Board
revoked 147's charter, banned several of its leaders from office for periods
up to five years, and directed it to transfer all its possessions to a new local.
If 147 disobeyed these orders, they were to be enforced by strikes against
its employers.
In the trial of Moore v. Moreschi31 these facts were practically uncon-
tested. In order to justify intervention in the case, Justice McCook first noted
that internal remedies were unavailable; then, substantively, he found a con-
spiracy by the International and its two chief officers to deprive local mem-
bers of the right to work and the hope of a livelihood. The formal hearing
at Washington, which was supposed to have afforded the due process of law,
was held to be in fact marked by prejudice, malice, excessive punishment,
and tangible injury to the accused. And since the Board had based its deci-
sion on the theory that Local 147's officers had appealed to a court sooner than
was permissible, the action taken at this hearing had specifically contra-
vened a finding on this point in Gallagher v. Moreschi. While recognizing
the unsavory history of the Local, the court declined to apply the "clean
hands" doctrine. But under a sweeping permanent injunction Moreschi and
Bove have been restrained from all interference with the Local or its juris-
diction. The next move is up to the still entrenched International adminis-
tration.
A second revolt against Bove's interference, this time by a local in Kings-
ton, New York, appears in the cases called Dusing v. Nuvzzo.32 Local 17, or-
ganized in 1936 among New Yorkers transferred to the Kingston area in
order to work on the New York City aqueduct, held its last election in 1937,
after which meetings ceased by order of Bove. Within the next four years
the Local's secretary, Nuzzo, henchman to Bove, mislaid $160,000 of the
Local's money, and became the prosperous owner of a night-club. On these
grounds one Dusing, acting in behalf of all who had lost their jobs by criti-
cizing Nuzzo, moved for a temporary injunction and for discovery of the
Local's records. Justice Murray granted both requests, and advised that the
night-club was suitable for "jazz . . . and boogie woogie" but not for serious
union meetings.3 3 An examination of the records confirmed Dusing's charges;
and, since both the Local and the International constitutions called for
quarterly accountings and annual elections, the Supreme Court ordered com-
pliance with these requirements.3 4 The court's theory, riding off boldly in
all directions, was that "if a member has a 'property right' in his position on
the roster, I think he has an equally enforceable property right in the election
of men who will represent him in dealing with his economic security and col-
31. N. Y. L. J., April 29, 1942, p. 1806, col. 7.
32. 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 345 (Sup. Ct. 1941), stay denied, 262 App. Div. 781, 27 N. Y.
S. (2d) 382 (3d Dep't 1941) ; 177 Misc. 35, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 882 (Sup. Ct. 1941), vnodi-
flied, 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N. Y: S. (2d) 849 (3d Dep't 1941).
33. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 345, 350 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
34. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 882 (Sup. Ct. 1941), modified,
31 N. Y. S. (2d) 841 (3d Dep't 1941).
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lective bargaining, where that right exists by virtue of express contract in
the language of a union constitution." 35 The ensuing order decreed that
Bove stop annoying Local 17, that Nuzzo (who had betrayed his fiduciary re-
sponsibilities) should make good the missing funds, and that no retaliation
should be taken against the complainants.
At the ensuing elections the old regime seems to have been completely over-
thrown. But the story of Nuzzo's financial indiscretions is not yet complete;
for in July of 1942 Governor Lehman ordered a grand jury to investigate
Local 17's affairs at a special term of the Supreme Court at Newburgh in
August.30 From this inquiry the state-wide activities~ of the Internatiunal
may be brought into the open.
These three case-histories are of course not typical of labor unions gener-
ally or even of intra-union disputes; but they do exemplify a class of cases
which recurrently arise out of a very few industrial situations. The unions
usually concerned, such as those in most branches of the building trades, and
among the movie operators or the teamsters, comprise skilled workers in in-
dustries where the "perishability" of products is most pronounced ;3 and cor-
ruption in these unions will follow fairly predictable patterns with regard to
its origin, expansion, and defenses. The first factor in determining the suc-
cess of judicial intervention is thus the industry's structure, and especially
its employment relationships. A second factor is the character of the Inter-
national and local constitutions. If time-consuming but futile court cam-
paigns are to be avoided, the officers' powers and limitations in disciplining
members, and the International's ability to make and unmake local charters at
will, must be taken into account. A third, and probably the most important
factor of all in any specific situation, is: do the members really want to be
saved? Often the size and composition of the protesting group will help an-
swer the question, but at least four variables must be ascertained before a
satisfactory result is possible.38 (a) Resistance to intrusion by outsiders
varies fairly directly with the age of the union and the extent to which it has
become hardened in its "folkways." (b) Elected officers command greater
personal loyalty than do officers thrust on a union from above. (c) The long-
er an officer has served, the more deeply rooted will be his hold on union
affairs, though the degree will depend upon (d) his past and present ability
to achieve high wages, good working conditions, and (perhaps) individual
favors for his constituents. In all events, it is clear that vindictive language
and extreme measures do not of themselves guarantee a desirable outcome.
The nature of these realistic criteria indicates why even intelligent and
sympathetic courts fail so regularly in attempts to handle revolts within labor
35. Id. at 37, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) at 8,4.
36. See N. Y. Times, July 10, 1942, p. 18, col. 3.
37. See generally SEm~iAN, L.u.ort CzArs (1938); Note (1941) 51 Ys.u L J. 331,
332. In food markets and with movie exhibitors, the value of the products will decrease
or perish unless the services are performed immediately. Building contractors are in an
analogous situation, since they can secure working capital only on short-term notes at
a high interest rate. In these situations the union's threat to strike obviously offers in-
creased opportunities for graft.
38. See generally WVEBB & WEBB, INDUSMTL Dz'soc c (2d ed. 1902) Pt. I, cc.
1 &2.
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unions. The cultural backgrounds typical of our judiciary leave them rather
ill-fitted at comprehending the personal relations between union men, par-
ticularly when those relations have reached a stage of high tension. If decisions
are to be made which will take account of the real factors in the problem,
probably union men can make them best. Since these disputes usually arise in
metropolitan areas, it might be best to place them before a quasi-court com-
posed of responsible and disinterested leaders of the important labor groups
in the area concerned. Appeals to the regular judiciary could follow, but
the insight of the experts would clarify future action. At any rate, continu-
ance of the present judicial system of handling an intra-union revolt as a
"epurely legal question" is unlikely to solve any problems.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LAWS PROVIDING
STERILIZATION FOR HABITUAL CRIMINALS*
SINCE sterilization operations under compulsory state laws have been
increasing rapidly,1 these statutes now present a more important problem
than existed when the Supreme Court first approved sterilization in Buck v.
Bell,2 in 1927. This growth of compulsory sterilization in America has re-
sulted from several different pressures. Eugenic aims have been combined
with the more immediately practical objectives of reducing public welfare
costs and punishing crime. And the statutory provisions reflecting these dif-
ferent aims have often been found to conflict with each other in judicial
review.
For example, sterilization of the feeble-minded has been authorized in about
thirty states,8 and the courts have generally been willing to take judicial notice
of the strong scientific evidence of the inheritability of feeble-mindedness. 4
However, most of these statutes have applied only to persons in state insti-
*Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 189 Okla. 235, 115 P. (2d) 123 (1941),
rev'd, 62 Sup. Ct. 1110 (U. S. 1942).
1. Compulsory sterilization by American states began slowly after 1900. Before
1928 about 9,000 operations were performed, but by 1942 the number had risen to 38,000.
Of these about 15,000 were in California and 4,000 in Virginia. Communication to the
YALE LAW JOURNAL from the Human Betterment Foundation, Pasadena, California (an
organization devoted to study of and publicity for eugenic sterilization), June 29, 1942.
Probably almost all of the persons affected were feeble-minded or insane. Cf. note 18
infra.
2. 274 U. S. 200 (1927). This decision laid no emphasis on the civil rights involved.
3. The twenty-eight state laws usually apply to feeble-minded, insane, and epilep-
tic persons. Former acts in New York, New Jersey, and Washington were declared un-
constitutional (see notes 7 and 10 infra), but a revised statute will probably be enacted
in Washington. A few state laws (notably in Vermont) have voluntary provisions, and
in other states (for example, Iowa and Oregon) mandatory laws are enforced only when
the inmate's consent is secured. See note 18 infra.
4. JENNINGS, THE BIoLoGIcAL BASIS OF HUMAN NATURE (1930) 240-243; WInIT-
NEY, THE CASE FOR STEUMZATION (1934) 67-123.
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tutions 5- indicating the purpose to reduce the cost of public care0 - and this
classification was held to violate the equal protection clause,7 until the Supreme
Court upheld such a provision in Buck v. Bell.8 While since that time steriliza-
tion acts have been widely upheld," the courts have continued to insist that ster-
ilization laws must provide a thorough hearing in each case,10 to allow each
individual to dispute the question whether his children are likely to be fee-
ble-minded." Cases involving mental deficiency have thus contributed to
the pattern of judicial treatment of sterilization laws an emphasis upon equal-
ity of classification and the requirement of individual hearings.
On the other hand, the sterilization of criminals authorized in thirteen
states' 2 raises different and more serious issues. A few of these statutes we,
5. In twenty-one of the tventy-eight existing acts.
6. Sterilization often makes possible the release of feeble-minded inmates, and will
dearly bring some reduction in the number of mentally deficient who will require care
in the next generation. For the debate on how much reduction is likly, compare
HuzAxN BEmTE -r Fou.EFO DATioN, HT I.xN STERILIZ,,IoT- TODAY (1940) 2, 4, 5, .%th
Price and Halperin, Sterilization Laws-Bane or Banner of Eugenics a:d Ptt!,ic Wcl-
fare? (1940) 45 Am .J3. Ui-rT.u. DcEicimcy 134. See also Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310,
130 S. E. 516 (1925) ; N. H. Laws 1929, c. 138.
7. Smith v. Board of Examiners, 85 N. J. L. 40, 88 At. 963 (Sup. Ct. 1913) ; Os-
born v. Thomson, 103 Misc. 23, 169 N. Y. Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1918), afftd, 185 App.
Div. 902, 171 N. Y. Supp. 1094 (3d Dep't 1918); Haaynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 201
Aich. 138, 166 N. NV. 938 (1918).
8. 274 U. S. 200 (1927), afftg 143 Va. 310, 130 S. E. 516 (1925).
9. State ex reL Smith v. Schaffer, 126 Kan. 607, 270 Pac. 6 04 (1928) ; In re Clay-
ton, 120 Neb. 680, 234 N.AV. 630 (1931); State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 2'9 Pac.
668 (1931); it re Main, 162 Okla. 65, 19 P. (2d) 153 (1933); Garcia v. State Dep't
of Institutions, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 152, 97 P. (2d) 264 (1939). See also Smith v. Wayne
Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N. W. 14u (1925). The cases cn sterilization lavs
are briefed in Notes (1926) 40 A. L. R. 535, (1927) 51 A. L. R. 855, (1933) Li7 A. L.
R. 237. See also Aronoff, The Constitutionality of Asecxualication Legislation il 11:c
Uzited States (1927) 1 ST. JoHN's L. Pv. 146.
10. Brewer v. Valk, 204 N. C. 16, 167 S. E. 638 (1933) ; In re Opinion of the Jumtices,
230 Ala. 543, 162 So. 123 (1935); In re Hendrickson, 123 P. (2d) 322 (Wash., 19421).
See also Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N. E. 2 (1921). Contra: Garcia v. State
Dep't of Institutions, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 152. 97 P. (2d) 264 (1939).
11. Cf. note 40 infra.
12. See CAi. PEN-. CODE (Deering, 1941) §§ 645, 2670; Co.jNN. GE-:. STA.T. (19310)
§2683; Dz. REv. CoDE (1935) §§3093 to 3100; ID.AHo Conz A-. -. (1932) §64-601 to
612; IowA CODE (Reichmann, 1939) § 2437.01 to 2437.32; KA.. GE.u. STAT. A:. (Cor-
rick, 1935) § 76-149 to 155; NEm. CorP. STaT. (Dorsey, 1929) § 83-1.01 to 1510; N. D.
Laws 1927, c. 263; Ox.A. STAT. AIwI. (1941) tit. 35, §§ 141 to 146 (passed in 1933),
and tit 57 §§ 171 to 195 (passed in 1935, the provision involved in the principal case);
OaR. Co-xP. LAws AN.N. (1940) § 127-01 to 811; UrAH Rsv. STAT. A:.;. (1933)
§ 89-0-1 to 89-0-12; WAsH. REv. STaT. AwN. (Remington, 1932) § 2287 (passed in 1W9) ;
Wis. STAT. (1941) § 46.12. With three exceptions (California, WasIhington, and the
1935 Oklahoma law), the provision for criminals is incidentally mentioned in lavs pri-
marily intended and used for sterilizing mental defectives. Cf. note 18 infra.
Several other criminal sterilization laws have been declared unconstitutional, on
various grounds. Iowa Laws 1913, c. 187, and Nuv. Ruv. LAws (1912) § 0)3 V;,Cre held
to provide cruel and unusual punishments. See note 13 infra. In cases involving steriliza-
tion of the feeble-minded, N. J. Laws 1911, c. 190, and N. Y. Laws 1912, c. 445, were
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clearly intended to provide a more severe punishment for habitual and sex
criminals, and in a few early cases such laws were invalidated on the ground
that sterilization was a cruel and unusual punishment.1 a But most of these
acts also profess an eugenic purpose,14 although the scientific evidence tends
invalidated under the equal protection clause (see note 7 supra), and Ind. Acts 1907, c.
215, and WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §§ 6957-6968 (passed in 1921)
were declared unconstitutional on the ground of insufficient provisions for notice and
hearing (see note 10 supra). See also Note (1937) 17 B. U. L. REv. 246.
13. Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (S. D. Iowa 1914), rev'd on other grounds, 242
U. S. 468 (1917); Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D. Nev. 1918). Contra: State
v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75 (1912). The existing Washington and California
acts [CAL. PEN. CoDE (Deering, 1941) § 645] and the former Nevada act provide
the clearest examples of purely punitive laws; after a conviction for statutory rape,
sterilization is authorized "in addition to such other punishment" as may be imposed,
Moreover, Washington includes "habitual criminals" in the same provision. And com-
pare Oax. Comp. LAWs ANN. (1940) § 127-802, 805: although the act is expressly de-
clared to be non-punitive, the conviction of a sex criminal is to be followed by notice to
the sterilization board, and the usual penal sentence is deferred until the board has decided
whether he should be sterilized. Compare the two Oklahoma acts, infra note 14.
Also dearly punitive are a group of statutes providing sterilization for prison in-
mates who show continued sex perversion. Another California Act [CAL. Pau. Coua
(Deering, 1941) § 2670] covers lifers and recidivists; and the Nebraska act provides cas-
tration in such cases [see NEB. Comp. STAT. (Dorsey, 1929) § 83-1504]. See also the
use of the Utah statute in Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 Pac. 921 (1929), cited
infra note 14.
14. Two state acts are expressly limited to the criminally insane, whose sterilization
may be justified because insanity is often hereditary. Thus in Delaware habitual crim-
inals may be examined for mental abnormality or disease; and the Kansas act is limited
to cases where defendant's children would be defective or feeble-minded with criminal
tendencies. (An identical North Dakota provision, in N. D. CoMP. LAws ANN. (1913)
§§ 11429 to 11438, was replaced by N. D. Laws 1927, c. 263).
But all other acts are broader in scope. The most common type of statute-found
in Idaho, Iowa, North Dakota, Oregon, and (until recently) Washington-covers the
feeble-minded, insane, "habitual criminals", moral degenerates, and sexual perverts. An
eugenic purpose is indicated in these acts by the requirement of an express finding, after
an individual hearing, that the defendant's children would inherit their parent's anti-
social tendency. In Nebraska the same provisions are applied only to inmates about to
be released from state institutions, obviously for eugenic purposes; the Oklahoma Act
of 1933 contains the same limitation, but it is not clear whether the required eugenic
finding is required for habitual criminals. The less elaborate Connecticut statute is less
definite on its coverage, but requires the same eugenic finding; Wisconsin includes crini-
inals, but the required finding is vaguely phrased, that procreation is "inadvisable". Simi-'
lar but vaguer provisions appeared in the older invalidated acts in New Jersey, New
York, and Indiana. In the few instances where "habitual criminal" is defined (in Cali-
fornia, Delaware, both Oklahoma acts, and the invalidated Washington act), a standard
of three convictions for felonies is adopted. While these laws have clearly eugenic fea-
tures, and the most common type is even expressly non-punitive, they probably also
embody a desire to prevent or punish crime; and they can be so used. Cf. p. 1384 in ra.
For example, another provision in the similar Utah act provides sterilization for "habitual
degenerate criminal tendencies," and the usual eugenic finding is required. Nevertheless,
in one of the few reported criminal sterilization cases (cf. note 13 supra), an apparently
punitive order was made; and the court annulled it for insufficiency of evidence about the
defendant's heredity. Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 Pac. 921 (1929).
to show that criminal traits are not inheritable.1" A many-sided maladjust-
ment between an individual and his environment is now recognized as the
typical background of criminality;16 and even the most ardent advocates of
eugenic sterilization hesitate to say that an "hereditary criminal tendency"
can be isolated from the complex factors that produce a criminal.1 7 These
doubts may explain why the criminal sterilization statutes have evidently only
been rarely applied.' 8
The constitutional problems involved in such statutes have recently been
raised in a test case' 9 brought under the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Ster-
ilization Act of 1935.20 This act defines an habitual criminal as anyone con-
victed three times of felonies involving moral turpitude, except for crimes
against the revenue and liquor laws, embezzlement, and political offences.
After an investigation by the state Attorney General, proceedings against the
15. "There is more unanimity today than ever before that criminality, per se, is
not inherited, and that criminals, as criminals, should not be subjected to compulsory
sterilization." FI-K, CAUSES OF CRU~m (1938) 209-210. See also LAc;r' sx, HutAN
STanZATIoN (1932) 178-182, and CommITTEE oF THE AmicAN NEM'fOTLOICAL Asso-
ClATION, EUGENICAL STERILIZATION (1936) c. VIII.
16. See SUTHERLAND, PRIxNciPLs OF CRIMINOLOGY (1939) ; HzLv, Tun I.oxvu,.tA
DELINQUENT (1915).
17. The attitude of the Human Betterment Foundation, a leading organization de-
voted to promoting eugenic sterilization, is significant. In a letter accompanying their
legislative suggestions, President Gosney said in 1930: "Ve feel strongly that no attempt
should be made at the present time to apply sterilization to criminals as such. . . . The
criminal may and often should be sterilized on eugenic grounds without reference to his
crime." Quoted in 3 EUGENICS 110 (1930). Cf. A. B. A. Rr,. (1928) 575-577. In a
communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL, July 15, 1942, the Foundation reaffirmed its
position that it does not actively advocate sterilization of criminals as such.
18. No complete figures are available on the number of criminals sterilized under
the thirteen state acts (see note 12 supra). Communications have been received by the
YALE LAw JomN.A_ from Idaho (July 13, 1942), Iowa (July 24), Oklahoma (June 30),
Oregon (July 23 and August 3), Utah (July 28), Washington (July 10 and 28), and
Wisconsin (July 22). Apparently these acts have not often been invoked against criminals.
No habitual criminals have been sterilized in Iowa, Idaho (where the whole la, is now
a dead letter), or Utah [but see Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 Pac. 921 (1929), cited
mupra note 14]. In other states, along with a large number of the feeble-minded, a few
criminals have been sterilized, under various circumstances. In Wisconsin tventy-five
criminally insane have been sterilized, but no criminals as such. Under the Oregon law
(as in Iowa), in practice the inmate's consent is required for operations; and under this
arrangement thirty-one criminals have been voluntarily sterilized. In Washington, the
act of 1921 has not been used on criminals. As for the act of 1909, the records show no
indication that the sterilization order upheld in State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 Pac. 75
(1912), was ever carried out; but one other "habitual criminal" was sterilized under this
act in 1925. The present Washington Dep't of Public Institutions has indicated the view
that sterilization of criminals is eugenically unsound. Finally, in Oklahoma the first
proceedings brought under the separate act of 1935 resulted in the Supreme Court test
in the principal case.
19. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 189 Okla. 235, 115 P. (2d) 123 (1941),
rev'd, 62 Sup. Ct. 1110 (U. S. 1942).
20. OxRA. STAT. ANN. (1936) tit. 57, §§ 171 to 195. For the previous Oklahoma act
of 1933 [OKa.A STAT. AmuI. (1936) tit. 35, §§ 141 to 146J, see note 14 sipra.
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criminal are begun under civil procedure in the state district courts, with a
jury trial if desired by either party. The scope of the hearing is limited to
applying the statutory definition and to finding whether the operation would
be detrimental to the defendant's health; there is no determination whether
the individual is likely to have children with criminal tendencies. 21
In the test case, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,22 the defendant's
three convictions, all prior to the passage of the sterilization act, were for
stealing chickens and robbery with fire-arms. In the Oklahoma Supreme
Court the statute and the sterilization order were upheld by a five to four
decision. The majority felt that the act was wholly eugenic and not penal,
and that eugenic sterilization of criminals was a proper exercise of legislative
discretion under the police power. The United States Supreme Court, unani-
mously reversing, indicated a new recognition of the important human rights
involved in sterilization, but narrowed the decision by grounding it upon the
traditional doctrines used in connection with sterilization of the feeble-minded.
Mr. Justice Douglas; speaking for the majority group of seven, found a denial
of equal protection in the exception made for embezzlers, while Chief Justice
Stone, concurring, put his chief emphasis on the limited individual hearing
as a violation of procedural due process. Mr. Justice Jackson agreed with
both objections, and hinted at the broader question of substantive due pro-
cess as a constitutional limit on the legislature's power to sterilize.2 3
Several important issues concerning criminal sterilization depend upon
construction of the Oklahoma statute. Although the Oklahoma court major-
ity declared that the law was not penal but eugenic, 24 their reasoning that the
legislature's intent was wholly eugenic is not convincing. It is true that the
act provides for civil procedure, and the sterilization order is not formally
part of a criminal judgment. And an eugenic purpose may be argued from
the fact that all habitual criminals are included, those at large as well as
those in institutions. Yet, since several courts have invalidated sterilization
acts which applied only to institutionalized persons on the ground that this
limitation was a denial of equal protection, the act's applicability to all
criminals may have been intended to avoid this constitutional objection. A
more definite indication of the act's punitive intent is the testimony in the
legislature, by one of its authors, that it would have a deterrent effect on
crime.2 5 Moreover, in this act the legislature omitted several important lim-
itations which had emphasized the eugenic character of the previous Okla-
homa act.26 The blanket provisions of the present act include no upper age
limit. It applies to all institutionalized persons, even lifers, and not simply
to those about to be released. And finally, all habitual criminals are included,
without the usual finding that the defendant's children are likely to have
criminal tendencies.27 While the legislature's intent may have been in part
eugenic, the act unmistakably had punitive features.
21. For the more usual requirement of an eugenic finding in each case, see note 14
supra.
22. 189 Okla. 235, 115 P. (2d) 123 (1941), rev'd, 62 Sup. Ct. 1110 (U. S, 1942).
23. See p. 1387 and note 48 infra.
24. See 189 Okla. 235, 237-238, 115 P. (2d) 123, 126 (1941).
25. See Note (1941) 9 U. oF Ci. L. REV. 145, 147, n. 18.
26. See OK.A. STAT. AN. (1941) tit. 35, § 141. See notes 12 and 14 supra,
27. See note 14 supra.
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If, then, the act has a punitive character, it raises tvo constitutional prob-
lems. Admittedly it would be ex post facto28 when applied to situations
where, as in the Skinner case, all the defendant's criminal convictions took
place before the Act was passed. In the second place, the Oklahoma court
expressly refused to pass on whether sterilization is a cruel and unusual pun-
ishment,29 and as such forbidden by the state constitution. 0 Two of the three
early cases held that it was cruel and unusual.3' While sterilization may not
be physically painful, mental suffering has been recognized as an element of
cruel and unusual punishments. After a person has been sterilized, "the hu-
miliation, the degradation, the mental suffering are always present and
known by all the public, and will follow him wheresoever he may go." 32 By
enlightened modem standards, sterilization should be recognized as exceed-
ing the limits of humane punishments for crime.
Even if the act is considered to have no punitive features, serious questions
as to its validity as an eugenic measure are raised under the equal protection
and due process clauses. While all members of the Federal Supreme Court
recognized thatthe importance of the personal rights involved required strict
judicial scrutiny of the act,33 their opinions were based on rather nar-
row issues. While expressly reserving judgment on the other constitutional
issues involved, MTIr. Justice Douglas seized upon the exemption for embez-
zlement to invalidate the Act under the equal protection clause."t It is true
that the act would permit unequal treatment of two crimes that are intrin-
28. The Oklahoma court recognized this; see 189 Okla. 235, 237, 115 P. (2d) 123,
125-126 (1941). If the United States Supreme Court had desired to make the narroes!
ruling possible in this case, they could have reviewed the construction of the OkIahoma
statute to enforce the federal guarantee against ex post facto laws. (U. S. Cor:.sT. Art.
I, §10).
29. See 189 Okla. 235, 237, 115 P. (2d) 123, 126 (1941).
30. OKLA. CO-NST. Art. 2, § 9. The guarantee in the federal bill of rights (U. S.
CoxsT. A-zou. VIII) does not apply against state action. See O'Neil v. Vermont,
144 U. S. 323, 331-332 (1892).
31. See note 13 supra.
32. Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413, 416 (S. D. Iowa, 1914), rev'd on olher gror:ds.
242 U. S. 46S (1917).
33. See the three opinions in Skdnner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 62 Sup. Ct.
1110 (U. S. 1942); Mr. Justice Douglas, at 1111. 1113; Chief Justice Stone, at 1115; Mr.
Justice Jackson, at 1116.
34. This point was neither discussed in the Oklahoma court's opinion nor %,as it
emphasized as error on appeal; in petitioner's brief submitted along with the petition for
certiorari, it was discussed for a page (at 23-24), but the actual brief only mentioned it
incidentally. Since the counsel for petitioner was called in at the last minute on both
occasions, both these briefs had to be prepared in great haste, and it is possible that the
Supreme Court was reluctant to make a broad decision affecting other statutes which
were not fully presented. After oral argument had been waived by both parties t!) the
appeal, the Supreme Court requested an appearance by the State. WVhile the state Attorney
General in oral argument suggested that perhaps the legislature intended to include
crimes of "violence" and exempt crimes of "artfulness", he frankly admitted that the
exception in question was of doubtful validity. Communication to the Y.AL Lw JoUPI;AL
from the office of the Attorney General of Oklahoma, June 22, 1942. Cf. note 42 infra.
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sically the same. Larceny (which is covered) is only technically different
from embezzlement (which is exempted), 3r and it would not be seriously
argued that different hereditary tendencies could be expected from these
legally different classes of criminals. Yet the situation of a thrice-convicted
larcenist who is sterilized, and a thrice-convicted embezzler who is left free,
is unlikely to occur. Since the Skinner case presented several more serious
constitutional questions, the remote possibility indicated seems rather a
minor issue on which to base a major decision. Moreover, no other such
arbitrary classifications appear in other sterilization acts. 0 Consequently,
the Supreme Court's emphasis on equality of classification does not seem to
be the most appropriate judicial approach to criminal sterilization laws.
The traditional insistence on individual hearing 7 may have been responsi-
ble for the judicial proceedings established in the Oklahoma act.8 But the
hearing provided does not include a determination that the defendant's chil-
dren are likely to have criminal tendencies, and on this ground Chief Justice
Stone and Mr. Justice Jackson thought the act violated procedural due pro-
cess.39 While a hearing to examine the defendant's family history may give
indications of .the presence of hereditary feeble-mindedness, 40 it is difficult to
understand what enlightening evidence could be presented to show that a
person's unborn children would, or would not, have hereditary criminal ten-
dencies. As the Oklahoma court majority pointed out,41 the evidence about
a person at such-a hearing would only be speculative. But the logical con-
clusion from this is, not that the legislature may therefore sterilize all ha-
bitual criminals without hearing, but that a legislative "finding" dealing in-
discriminately with all habitual criminals is so speculative as to be of very
dubious value. Thus an evaluation of procedural due process for steriliza-
tion of criminals leads directly into the question of substantive due process. 42
35. See 62 Sup. Ct. at 1112-1114.
36. Apparently the only other exception contained in a criminal sterilization law is
the provision in one California act to exempt voluntary patients in state hospitals. CAL.
PEN. CODE (Deering, 1941) §2670. Apart from the now accepted limitation to persons
in public institutions, the laws for sterilizing the feeble-minded do not contain any
arbitrary exceptions that would justify judicial emphasis on equality of classification,
37. See note 10 supra.
38. O.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 172. This judicial hearing is almost unique. But
see MicH. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1936) § 14.383 (on the feeble-minded).
39. See Chief Justice Stone, 62 Sup. Ct. at 1115; Mr. Justice Jackson, id. at 1115-
1116.
40. See for example the statement of facts in State v. Troutman, 50 Id. 673, 679,
299 Pac. 668, 670 (1931). In a proceeding to sterilize a feeble-minded inmate of a state
institution, the evidence revealed that defendant's father, mother, five brothers, and six
sisters were also feeble-minded and in state institutions. Moreover, his aunt had seven
children, three of whom were feeble-minded and institutionalized; and one of these had
ten children, all defective and institutionalized.
41. See 189 Okla. 235, 239, 115 P. (2d) 123, 128 (1941).
42. The present Supreme Court's reluctance to invoke substantive due process has been
particularly evident in the 1941-1942 term. While anxious to protect civil liberties against
state action, the court has resorted to other verbal formulas which have had a less du-
bious recent history. Thus in Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1942), the Fourteenth
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The Oklahoma court in upholding the act under the due process clause
gave great weight to the legislature's findings of a substantial relation to the
general welfare, 43 by a vote of five to four. This presumption of the consti-
tutionality of legislation has received increasing respect from the courts in
the last few years ;44 but, as the four dissenting Oklahoma judges pointed
out, the presumption usually "does not apply in all its force" when personal
liberties are involved.45 In the Skinner case three separate opinions in the
United States Supreme Court have unanimously reaffirmed a belief that the
right to have children is among the most important civil liberties,40 both
to society and to the individual. A reckless use of sterilization will de-
prive the community of valuable citizens, and if available the device might
even be turned against minorities deemed subversive.47 The damage, done,
cannot be undone. As Mr. justice Jackson put it, "there are limits to the
extent to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct biological
experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers
of a minority. ' 4 8 And Chief justice Stone's opinion has strong indications
of a similar attitude.49 On the analogy of the "clear and present danger" tet
in the free speech cases,50 no strong likelihond of preventing future crime
appears to justify sterilization of habitual criminals. The requirements of a
non-arbitrary basis of classification and of an individual hearing may be rele-
vant to protecting the feeble-minded against abuse of the power to sterilize.
But criminal traits are not known to be inheritable, and the right to have
children has now been recognized as one of the higher civil liberties. In this
situation the courts should be willing to face the eugenic issue squarely by
declaring criminal sterilization laws invalid on their face.
Amendment was invoked without reference to any particular clause. Presumably the cturt
fears that preservation of the due process clause will allow its revived ue by a poEsible
future conservative court against economic regulation. But the battle over LcMner v.
New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), has now been won; and if its philosophy should again
come to dominate the court, it may be doubted whether its fulfillment would be fore-
stalled by the distinction between "due process" and "fourteenth admendment" ur "equal
protection".
43. See 189 Okla. 235, 239-240, 115 P. (2d) 1a3, 127-128 (1941). But apparently very
little evidence was presented to the legislature before the law was enacted. Communi-
cation to the YALE LAW JOtURNAL from the office of the Attorney General uf Oklahoma,
June 30, 1942.
44. See for example O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 232 U. S. 251
(1931); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941); compare Mr. Justice Black, dissent-
ing in Polk and Co. v. Glover, 305 U. S. 5, 10 (1933).
45. See 189 Okla. 235, 241, 115 P. (2d) 123, 129 (1941). Compare Schneider v.
State, 303 U. S. 147, 161 (1939), (1940) 40 CoL L. REv. 531; United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938).
46. See note 33 supra.
47. It is suggested by 'Mr. Justice Douglas, 62 Sup. CL at 1113 (U. S. 1942), that
recldess sterilization might even affect the future character of the race.
48. 62 Sup. Ct. 1110, 1116 (U. S. 1942).
49. See 62 Sup. Ct. 1110, 1115 (U. S. 1942).
50. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95-96, 104-105 (1940); Vechsler, Syn-
posium on Civil Liberties (1941) 9 A. R.m L. ScHOOL REV. 831; Comment (1942) 51
YAiE L. J. 798, 801-802.
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NEW ADMINISTRATIVE DEFINITIONS OF "ENEMY" TO SUPERSEDE
THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
BECAUSE of the more complex international economic relations and the great
distance between the United States and its enemies in the present war, the pre-
vention of trade beneficial to the enemy' has required new techniques different
from the common law doctrines. Since direct commerce with enemy territory,
originally the most important problem, is now made impossible by the naval
blockade and the shortage of shipping space, the traditional prohibitions on
trade with persons of enemy domicil are of little importance. And for the
same reasons the European neutrals - Portugal, Spain, France, Switzerland,
Sweden, and Turkey- are as inaccessible as the Axis countries. But in
neutral countries in South America, Axis-dominated firms, or neutral com-
panies with established commercial relations with the enemy, have been
profiting by trade with the United States. In many instances, firms with
these hostile associations can be injured or destroyed by withholding neces-
sary American supplies. However, the success of the "Good Neighbor" policy
requires that interference with South American economic affairs be kept
at a minimum. In response to these conflicting needs of war and diplomacy,
the Treasury Department has recently issued new trading with the enemy
regulations which mark an important step in the evolution of wartime com-
mercial law.
2
As international economic relations have become more complex, the Anglo-
American concepts of trading with the enemy have been gradually expanded
in order to include certain persons in neutral territory.3 When the common
law rules were developed in England, the international trade involved-
consisting chiefly of shipments of bulky tangible goods between England and
the continent, and between the American colonies and the various countries
in Europe4 -was usually carried on in the European countries by resident
citizens of those countries. The principal tests of enemy character for com-
mercial purposes were thus enemy nationality and domicil in hostile territory,5
Since there were few enemy firms in neutral territory, these criteria were
effective at that time in severing most communication with the enemy country
and colonies.
1. Alien enemies in this country are not considered enemies for the purpose of
trading with the enemy measures. See p. 1393 and note 45 infra.
2. Treasury Dep't, General Ruling No. 11, March 18, 1942, 7 FED. RmG. 2168 (1942).
3. For a history of trading with the enemy regulation see Hunter, Alicn Rights 1n
Wartine (1918) 17 Micir. L. REv. 33; see also Napoleon's Cownter-Blockade (1940) 85
J. RoYAL UNITED SERv. INsT. 655. Valuable historical material may also be found in BLUM
AND ROSENBAUM, TRADING WITH THE ENEmY (1940); Parry, The Trading with the
Enemy Act (1941) 4 MOD. L. REv. 161.
4. Under mercantilist regulation, the colonies were of course required to trade pri-
marily with the mother country; but some trade continued in peacetime between the col-
onis and other countries in Europe.
5. See Parry, The Trading with the Enemy Act (1941) 4 MoD. L. Rv. 161, 172;
Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] 1 K. B. 857, 872; Alcinous v. Nigreu, 4 El. & BI. 217
(Q. B. 1854). These common law doctrines made possible a desirable uniformity, for
an enemy for commercial purposes was an enemy for all other purposes.
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By 1914 economic change had made these common law doctrines inade-
quate.6 Large corporations spread their business across national boundaries,-
or established subsidiaries in neutral states to hide the parent corporation's
identity. Moreover, with the development of complex credit devices,3 com-
mercial transactions were no longer always marked by easily detected bulk
shipments of tangible goods.9 Since modern warfare was dependent upu ,n
certain strategic raw materials, it was now more important than ever to
block all these new forms of foreign trade by an enemy country. Cconse-
quently, during the last war Great Britain1° and the United States" hoth
enacted statutes designed to broaden the common law definition of "enemy".
The test of residence in enemy territory was inserted' 2 to preserve the
common law doctrine; and all corporations organized under the laws of an
enemy state were included.13 But restrictions on British and American
trade were also extended in order to bring economic pressure on neutral firms
who traded with the enemy, although under international law such firms had
a right to trade with either belligerent.' 4  First, the statutes defined as
enemies, and thus cut off from English (or American) trade, all neutral firms
who did some business in enemy territory.15 As a sanction to reach the
neutral companies who traded with the enemy on neutral soil, the executive
was authorized to blacklist any such business cooperating with enemy com-
mercial policy.' 6 Moreover, firms wherever incorporated which were "con-
trolled" by enemies were later added to the proscribed group by judicial
decision.' 7 Finally, all transactions "for the benefit of" enemies were broadly
6. See cases collected in 1 HALsBRy's L.ws OF E.NGLN:D (Hailsham's 2d ed. 1931)
3779, note u. But see Re An Arbitration, [19411 3 All Eng. R. 419, 425 (C. A.), where
differences between the common law and modern practice are deprecated.
7. See Norem, Deterinination of Enemy Character of Corporations (1930) 24 A'.
J. INT. L. 310; see Janson v. Driefontein Consol. Mines, [1902] A. C. 4S4, 497.
S. See 2 LAuTERPAcT, OPPENHEM*'S INTERNATio.N.-m LAw (6th ed. 1940) § 83(a).
9. See Tingley v. Muller, [1917] 2 Ch. 144, 172.
10. 4 & 5 GEo. V, c. 87 (1914); 5 & 6 GEQ. V, c. 12 (1914); 8 & 9 GEo. V, c. 31
(1915). Upon the outbreak of the present war, a new statute was enacted. 2 & 3 Gzo.
VI, c. 89 (1939). Further references to British practice Will be supported by citations
to the 1939 Act, which is a synthesis of the World War legislation.
11. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. Aip. §§ 1-31 (1940). During the War of 1812
and the Civil War, Trading with the Enemy Acts were in force. 2 STAT. 778 (1812);
12 STAT. 255, 257 (1861).
12. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U.S. C. AP. § 2(a) (1940); 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 89,
§2(1) (b) (1939).
13. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. APP. §2(a) (1940); 2 & 3 G.. VI, c. S9,
§2(1)(d) (1939).
14. 2 WHEATo.N, IN-TERNATioAL LAw (Keith's ed. 1929) 925.
15. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C.AP. §2(a) (1940); 2 & 3 Gm. VI, c. 89,
§2(1)(e) (1939).
16. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C.ArP. §2(c) (1940); 2 & 3 Go. VI, c. 89,
§ 2(2) (1939).
17. Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co. [1916] 2 A. C. 307. See note 63
and p. 1396 infra. There was no statutory authorization for this decision. The "control"
doctrine was later inserted in the peace treaties. See TRE.ATY o VrasAuILs, Art. 297(b),
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prohibited.' 8 The acts were enforced by criminal prosecutions, with severe
penalties provided 19 for any firm in America or Britain which traded with
an enemy.
While these acts still remain technically in force, judicial administration
of these general prohibitions has been abandoned in America because of its
inevitable injustices and inflexibility. Under these vague statutory criteria o
businessmen could not readily predict whether a proposed transaction would
be illegal; and the threat of criminal prosecution discouraged innocent com-
merce when the prospective customer's background was not thoroughly
familiar. Moreover, the fixed statutory definitions of the 1917 Act are
inadequate to cope with the present problem. The delicate South American
situation requires a flexible supervision empowered to change regulations
without waiting for Congressional authorization. As a result, the World
War legislation has been superseded by sweeping administrative orders.
The trend towards administrative control over all international trade
was begun, during the year before American entry into the war, by
regulations freezing Axis and Axis-controlled funds in this country.-1
When a European country was taken over by Germany, the funds in
America belonging to the invaded country's nationals could be used to supply
dollar exchange to the Axis for international trade. To prevent German use of
these intangible assets for payment to neutrals or Americans, the Treasury
used Section 5(b) of the 1917 Act 22 to issue lists of "blocked nationals",
and a Treasury license was required to transact any business in which
"blocked nationals" had a direct or indirect interest.23 The definition of
which permitted the Allies to retain and liquidate the sequestered property of German
nationals, or of companies "controlled" by them.
18. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U.S.C. App. §3(a) (1940); 2 & 3 Gwo. VI, c. 89,
§1(2)(a) (1939).
19. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. App. § 16 (1940), provides a $10,000 fine, ten
years imprisonment, or both. 2 & 3 GEO. VI, c. 89, § 1(1) (1939), provides a prison
term of seven years, or a fine, or both.
20. The Treasury Dep't itself has pointed out this disadvantage in the 1917
statutory plan. See Dep't of Treasury Release, March 19, 1942, 1 C. C. H. War Law
Serv. ff 9051 (1942). An example of the confusion which may be caused by a similarly
broad statutory term, "ally of the enemy" [see 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. Arr. § 2
,(1940)], is a recent case in which Finland was held to be an ally of the enemy. Sundell
v. Lotmar Corp., 44 F. Supp. 816 (S. D. N. Y. 1942). This case was decided before the
Treasury issued General Ruling No. 11 (see p. 1391 et seq., inira).
21. Licensing over all exports, and even blacklisting, were also instituted in tli
period. See 5 BULLETIN OF THE DEP'T OF STATE 54-56, 57-58, 99, 419 (1941).
22. The Trading with the Enemy Act has remained in force ever since its enact-
ment. The Joint Resolution of March 3, 1921, 41 STAT. 1359 (1921), declaring that cer-
tain Acts of Congress should henceforth be construed as if the war had ended, expressly
excepted The Trading with the Enemy Act. Section 5(b) of the Act was amended by
a joint resolution on May 7, 1940, to give the President or officer designated by him the
complete freezing powers now in existence. 54 STAT. 179 (1940), 50 U. S. C. APP. § 5(b)
(1940). Cf. First War Powers Act, approved Dec. 18, 1941, 55 Stat. 838 (1941), 1 Pren-
tice-Hall Nat. Defense Serv. 136,627 (1941).
23. A typical freezing order is Executive Order No. 8389, § 10(b), 5 Fzo. REG, 1400
(Pt. 2, 1940), covering Norwegian and Danish nationals.
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such a national included any "person who has been, or there is reasonable
cause to believe has been, domiciled in, or a subject, citizen or resident of"
any nation whose funds had been frozen.2- The freezing regulations thus
forbade the use of credit accounts in America by anyone who was likely.
by present or past citizenship or residence, to be now under enemy control.
However, the different definition of prohibited trade in tangible goods in the
Trading with the Enemy Act of 191725 was revived2 by American entry
into the war. Since the problems of defining an enemy were essentially the
same in both types of trade, tangible and intangible, the definitions were
unified by an extraordinary device. Under his licensing power,2 the Presi-
dent issued a general license flatly authorizing any commercial transaction
previously forbidden by the Trading with the Enemy Act ;- but such trans-
actions were required to conform to any Treasury Rulings under the freezing
powers.29 By executive act, the statutory prohibitions were thus suspended
and replaced by similar administrative regulations. Apparently these can be
amended and further changed at any time by administrative action, and the
courts would be unlikely to interfere with such action. The basic policies for
American commercial warfare are now formulated by the Board of Economic
Warfare,30 and the detailed administration of trading with the enemy is carried
on by the Treasury Department.
This unified control over trading with the enemy was implemented by a
Ruling from the Treasury31 which abolished the terms "enemy" and "bloched
national" and substituted the new term "enemy national". The funds of an
"enemy national" are frozen, and, except under Treasury license, individuals
or firms "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" may not com-
municate with him in any way, or
"send . . . or attempt to send . . . import, export . . . property
of any nature whatsoever, including checks, ... powers of attorney,
24. Executive Order No. 83S9, § 11(b), 5 F Fm. REc. 1400 (Pt. 2, 1940). See criticism
of these definitions of "national'" N. Y. L. J., Jan. 22, 1941, p. 336, col. 1 et scq.
25. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C.App. §§2, 3 (1940).
26. See note 22 supra.
27. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. App. § 4 (1940). The executive licensing power
has been used, particularly in England, for both individual and class licenses. Fror
American examples, compare General License No. 60 on China, 6 FED. RO. 37-27 (1941),
with General License No. 53, 6 FED. REG. 3556, 3946 (1941), cited note 28 infra,
28. 1 C. C. H. War Law Serv. ff14,833 (1942). See 7 FED. Rza. 2168 § 132.11(4
(1942). This general permission to trade was soon limited, by General License So. 53,
6 FED. RFG. 3556, 3946 (1941), to eight approved trading areas: Central and South
America, the British Empire, the USSR, the Dutch East Indies, the Dutch West Indies,
Belgian Congo, Greenland, and Iceland.
29. This device added another restriction to outstanding freezing c.ntrol licenses.
Dep't of Treasury Release, 'arch 19, 1942, 1 C. C. H. War Law Serv. f 9051 (1942).
30. "Administration . . . of activities relating to economic defense shall remain with
the . . . departments now charged with such duties but such administration shall cn-
form to the policies formulated or approved by the Board." Executive Order Xo. 339,
July 30, 1941, 6 FED. REG. 3823 (1941). The Secretary of the Treasury is a member of
the B. E. V.
31. Treasury Dep't, General Ruling No. 11, March 2a, 1942, 7 FEm. REG. 2108 (1942).
See the interpretation of these provisions in Pub. Circular No. 18, 7 FEu. REG. 2503 (1942).
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evidences of ownership . . . of property or contracts directly or
indirectly to or from an enemy national . . . ",82
In defining an "enemy national", the Treasury Ruling is largely limited to the
historic common law or statutory tests of presence or the doing of business"3
in enemy territory.3 4 Individuals "within" enemy territory are included;
but a partnership, corporation, or association is an "enemy national" only
"to the extent that it is actually situated within enemy territory." 85 Another
clause specifically mentions the government of a nation against which the
United States has declared war, and its agents wherever situated ;3 and the
government of any other blocked country having its seat in enemy territory
is covered, but its agents are included only if in enemy territory.8 7 And,
in order to bring pressure on neutrals trading with the enemy by with-
holding American trade from them, the Treasury issues a periodic "Pro-
claimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals" naming any other individuals
and firms which are to be treated as "enemy nationals".'8 In interpreting
this Treasury Ruling, most of the problems are raised in connection with the
provision covering individuals, partnerships, and corporations.
The provisions of the Treasury Ruling covering individuals80 expressly
retain the criterion of presence in enemy territory,40 although direct trade
32. Treasury Ruling, § 4, 7 FED. REG. 2168 (1942).
33. The historic significance of these twin principles is well discussed in Porter v.
Freudenberg, [1915] 1 K. B. 857. See also BLUM AND ROSENBAUm, TRADiNG WIThi Tr
ENEMY (1940) 3-10; Parry, The Trading with the Enemy Act (1941) 4 MoD. L, Rr.v.
161, 172 et seq.
34. Enemy territory includes areas occupied by hostile forces. The Treasury Ruling
defines these territories specifically. 7 FED. REG. 2168, § 2 (1942). In Great Britain, the
Board of Trade is also empowered to expand the definition of "enemy territory" by ad-
ministrative regulation. British Order-in-Council, amending Defence (Trading with the
Enemy) Regulations, S. R. & 0. 1940 No. 1214. Cf. Trading with the Enemy (Specified
Areas) Order, S. R. & 0. 1940 No. 1219, (adding all of France to the list of enemy
territory). But the United States does not treat unoccupied France as enemy territory.
(S. R. & 0., Statutory Rules and Orders, may be found in Butterworth's Emergency
Legislation Service, 1941 as well as in the official S. R. & 0. volumes).
35. Treasury Ruling § (1) (iii), 7 FED. REG. 2168 (1942).
36. Treasury Ruling §(1) (i), 7 FED. REG. 2168 (1942).
37. Treasury Ruling § (1) (ii), 7 FED. REG. 2168 (1942). This provision may have
been designed to allow trade with agents of the European Governments-in-exile.
38. To supplement the blacklist and gain more control over neutral traders who are
not under the jurisdiction of the United States, extra-legal pressures may be used. A
good example is the publication by the government of the names of neutral firms who
will not cooperate with American policy. But too extensive use of such techniques may
cause shortages of materials in the neutral states and arouse resentment. For the present
serious situation in Argentina, see N. Y. Times, July 25, 1942, p. 21, col. 1.
The Dep't of Commerce will provide names of approved firms in South America.
See N. Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1941, p. 11, col. 1.
39. Treasury Ruling § 1(iii), 7 FED. REG. 2168 (1942).
40. For the World War act, see note 12 supra; and see the discussion in Techt v.
Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 128 N. E. 185 (1920) (a case invalidating a devise of real prop-
erty to an American woman who married an enemy foreigner) ; Krachanake v. Acme
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with the enemy is unlikely today because of the inaccessibility of enemy
territory. Since the concept of "residence" in enemy countries confused and
narrowed the application of the World War statutes,41 the definition in the
Ruling has substituted the word "within". 4- Thus even transients in enemy
territory apparently now would be considered enemy nationals. As in the
last war, the definition includes Americans as well as neutrals or enemy
subjects in enemy territory, on the ground that anyone in the enemy country
is too closely associated with that national economy to deserve special con-
sideration for reasons of nationality. Injustices can usually be corrected by
a Treasury license to trade; and in cases of extreme hardship, the courts
have been willing to intervene and declare special exemptions from the statu-
tory definitions. 43 Other types of individuals are not covered by the terms
of the Ruling. Individuals in neutral territory may be important in helping
the enemy to maintain his foreign trade, but now they are reached only
through the blacklist.4 While alien enemies in the United States may be
dangerous in other respects, they have no connection with the enemy nation's
economy, and so are properly excluded from the commercial definition of
enemy individuals. 45
Mfg. Co., 175 N. C. 435, 95 S. E. 851 (1918); Tortoriello v. Seghorn, 103 Atd. 393
(N. J. Ch. 1918); Picciotto, Alien Enemies in English Law (1917) 27 YAImn L. J. 167.
41. See Stadtmuller v. Miller, 11 F. (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (see Note 43 infra).
42. Treasury Ruling § (1) (iii), 7 FED. Rmn. 2168 (1942). See General Lie. No. 53,
setting up several approved trade areas, 6 FED. RE. 3556, 3946 (1941).
43. The Trading with the Enemy Act authorized the sequestration of enemy property
in this country by the Alien Property Custodian [see 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C.
Arp. § 6 (1940)]; and in suits to recover seized property, courts have made some excep-
tions to the statutory test of residence for enemy character. See Vovinekel v. First
Federal Trust Co., 10 F. (2d) 19 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926) (Red Cross surgeon in Gennany not
an enemy); Stadtmuller v. Miller, 11 F. (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (Columbia profes-
sor unwillingly in Germany not an enemy). See also Van Dyke v. Adams, [1942] 1 Clh.
155 (prisoner of war not an enemy). And in Waldes v. Basch, 104 'Misc. 306, 179 N. Y.
Supp. 713 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd wmer., 191 App. Div. 904, 181 N. Y. Supp. 858 (Ist
Dep't 1920), Czechs resident in Germany during the last wvar were declared not to ba
enemies, in order to allow them to recover on a pre-war debt, because they had par-
ticipated in a successful uprising against Germany at the end of the var.
See also Mayer v. Louis Dreyfus & Cie. [1940] 4 All Eng. R. 157 (C. A.), and
Re An Arbitration, [1941] 3 All Eng. R. 419 (C. A.), cited note t2 infra. And Zee
the provisions allowing family remittances in General Lie. No. 32, 5 Fro. Rr,. 3531
(1940) and 6 FED. REr. 5467 (1941). Cf. 6 FED. RPa. 5S'M (1941).
44. The Treasury has noted that Axis representatives often place orders through
relatives and friends, whose enemy affiliations are not generally known. Dep't of Treasury
Release, M\arch 30, 1942, 1 C. C. L War Law Serv. 1 14,859 (1942).
45. The British Act, 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 89, § 2(1) (1939), provides expressly that no
individual is to be considered an enemy simply because he is an enemy subject. The
American Act reaches the same result by implication. The government supervises the
commercial activities of alien enemies in America through the alien registration, freez-
ing controls, and the blacklist. An interned alien enemy in this country is, however,
considered an enemy under the Act. See 1 C. C.H. War Law Serv. 1f 6030 (1942);
Tortoriello v. Seghorn, 103 At. 393 (N. J. Ch. 1918).
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If an individual or firm does only a part of its business in enemy territory,
the provisions of the Treasury Ruling make it an enemy only to the extent
of that business, 46 in order to allow trade with firms cooperating with the
European Governments-in-exile, and to retain the good will of the South
American neutrals by maintaining their normal trade as much as possible.
Under this doctrine of severability, neutral branches of an enemy concern, and
neutral concerns which have established commercial relations with the enemy,
are not enemies unless specifically blacklisted. This old doctrine originated in
the English prize courts,47 and has been adopted by America from British
experience in the last war. But these international businesses may be so closely
knitted in control or finance as to be incapable of separate treatment. 48 Since
such firms may represent an important part of Axis commercial relations
in South America, the American Government has used the blacklist to forbid
all trading with many international businesses.
International business partnerships are similarly severable according to the
location of their business.49 But partnerships are also affected by another
doctrine, evolved by judicial initiative in the last war. Because of the
intimate relations within a partnership, such organizations which include
"enemy nationals" along with neutral or American partners have been re-
garded in American courts as dissolved on the outbreak of war.60 This
judicial doctrine has of course not been affected by the executive suspension
of the Trading with the Enemy Act. While the future relation between the
two doctrines of severability and dissolution is not altogether clear, they
can be applied separately or in combination. Under the severability doctrine,
a partnership with an international business may be divided by the admin-
istrative Ruling into friendly and unfriendly parts, to define permissible
American trade with them. Under the dissolution doctrine, a partnership
with international membership is automatically dissolved by the outbreak
of war, and the proprietary interest of enemy partners may be terminated.51
If the two doctrines are applied to a given firm, both trade volume and business
management will be severed into friendly and unfriendly parts.
45. Treasury Ruling, § (1) (iii), 7 FED. REG. 2168 (1942).
47. The Portland, 3 C. Rob. 41 (Adm. 1800); see The Venus, 8 Cranch 253, 280
U. S. 1814). But see The Panariellos, 114 L. T. R. 670, 672 (P. C. 1916). This theory
was based originally on the assumption that only in case of presence in enemy territory
can an individual augment the resources of the enemy. As suggested, it has now been
adopted as a measure of political expediency.
48. See BLUM AND ROSENBAU-m, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY (1940), 5, 9 el seq.
49. Treasury Ruling § (1) (iii), 7 FED. REG. 2168 (1942). And see 7 Fr. REG.
2504 (1942).
50. Mayer v. Garvan, 278 Fed. 27 (C. C. A. 1st, 1922) ; Joring v. Harriss, 262 Fed.
974 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) (joint venture) ; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. 438 (N. Y.
1819). The same rule prevails in England. Stevenson & Sons v. Aktiengesellschaft f.
Cartonnagen-Industrie, [1918] A. C. 239. In case the partnership has added directly to
enemy resources, a neutral partner may be infected with enemy character. The Anglo-
Mexican, [1918] A. C. 422.
51. The assets of such a firm may be seized by the Alien Property Custodian, but
American citizens can recover their share. Mayer v. Garvan, 278 Fed. 27 (C. C. A. 1st,
1922).
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Effective control of hostile corporations remains the most complicated
problem in trading with the enemy regulations.5 2 In both the British and
the superseded American Acts, enemy corporations are defined as those incor-
porated or doing business in an enemy state.53 But within neutral territory
enemy trade could continue, unaffected by these regulations, with neutral
corporations serving as cloaks for enemy firms or with genuine neutral cor-
porations. In dealing with this problem in the last war, the British developed
the "benefit" and "control" doctrines, and these doctrines indicate the factors
to be taken into consideration in making out the present American black-
list of corporations in neutral territory.
A cover-all provision forbidding all transactions "for the benefit of" an
enemy was included in both the British and American statutes." While the
scope of this clause was severely limited in the British cases during the last
war, the problems raised under it are important since the doctrine has been
restated in a recent American ruling.55 Apparently the provision was pri-
marily intended to forbid any indirect payments or transfers of goods to the
enemy,5 6 and, similarly, a payment to a South American firm for repay-
ment to Germany would probably be forbidden under the American blacklist.
In the typical situation, this section has been invoked by debtors, on the
ground that payment of their obligations would benefit the enemy; but the
defense has usually been disallowed because the transaction would not result in
an immediate financial benefit to the enemy during the war.5T For example,
an English or neutral creditor can recover from an English surety on a
German obligation, since this payment will not reduce the total debt owed
by the German principal. But an exception has recently been made where
the payment allows the German debtor to take advantage of favorable dis-
count provisions during the war.r* And it can be persuasively argued that
any fulfillment of suretyship obligations in favor of an enemy debtor will
52. See note 7 supra.
53. See notes 13 and 15 supra.
54. 40 STAT. 411, 50 U. S. C. App. §3(a) (1940); 2 & 3 GEO. VI, c. S9, §1(2)(a)
(1939).
55. See Pub. Circular No. 18, 7 FEt. REG. 2503 (1942).
56. See Rex v. Kupfer, [1915] 2 K. B. 321, 335. There are no important American
cases dealing with the "benefit" concept, since the United States was not at war long
enough to develop its doctrines as fully as the British had done by 1918. But see Swiss
Nat. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 267 U. S. 42 (1925), where an American company, wi;ch had
sold its German holdings to Germans during the war, was held to be still an enemy-
presumably because of the benefit to the enemy from the sale.
57. For example, in Schmitz v. Van der Veen & Co., 84 L. J. K. B. 861 (1915), the
English agent of a German manufacturer was allowed to collect on pre-war debts, but
the payments could not be forwarded to Germany till after the war. And see In re Kids-
mark's Will, 188 Iowa 1378, 177 N. W. 690 (1920), where an alien enemy was allowed
to take by devise, but the conveyance was delayed till after the war. Cf. Weiner v. Cen-
tral Fund, [1941] 2 All. Eng. R. 29 (K. B.).
58. R. & A. Kohnstanm v. Krumm (London), [1940] 2 K. B. 359.
59. Stockholms Enskilda Bank v. Schering, [1941] 1 K B.424. Since the court
in this case endorsed a broad conception of the "benefit" doctrine, and expressly refused
to draw a line for the future, this case may indicate a significant new extension in Eng-
lish law. This approach would weaken the force of the Kohnstatnm precedent.
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improve the credit standing of the enemy firm, and may also ensure a saving
in interest'during the war. Although these British cases represent a rather
restricted view, an extension of the concept of benefit to the enemy can
provide a logical basis for the American blacklist in the attempt to prevent
American trade with South American corporations who are themselves trad-
ing with "enemies". While direct trade in tangible goods from South America
to Europe is probably rare,60 intangible exchanges may still continne.0 1
Moreover, other neutral South American corporations maintain close trading
relations with Axis firms there. In extreme cases these may be blacklisted,
but the "Good Neighbor" policy prevents indiscriminate use of such economic
pressure.
The problem of neutral corporations 2 which really serve as cloaks for
enemy firms has not been handled by any of the above techniques, except
indirectly by pressure on neutral firms who help such corporations. To fill
this gap 'during the last war, in Dainder Company v. Continental Tyrc &
Rubber Company 3 an English court ventured without statutory authoriza-
tion to include as enemies any corporations "controlled" by persons who are
enemies under other sections of the Act. This "control" test is applied where
the directors or stockholders are enemies residing or doing business in enemy
territory, or persons who have been placed on the blacklist. By a Defence
Regulation in 1940, the "control" doctrine was formally incorporated into
British statutory scheme.0 4
Although the Axis-dominated firms in neutral South America present a
similar problem for America, proposals for the adoption of the "control" test
60. Air transport may possibly be used to carry valuable tangibles which occupy
little shipping space. Tungsten and mercury, both produced in South America, are pos-
sible examples. See SPIEGEL, THE EcoNoMics OF TOTAL WAR (1942) 293; N. Y. Times,
July 27, 1942, p. 4, col. 2.
61. The South American countries have instituted wartime licensing systems to
control foreign trade in intangibles, so that all such transactions would at least be known
to the South American government involved.
62. The Treasury Ruling § (1) (iii), 7 FED.'REG. 2168 (1942), applies the separabil-
ity doctrine to corporations. There is a possibility that some friendly businesses situated
in enemy territory will not be considered enemies, at least so far as their right to sue in
Briiish courts is concerned. A Dutch corporation doing business in occupied Netherlands
is not an enemy for the purpose of prosecuting a suit in the British courts. Re An Arbi-
tration, [1941] 3 All Eng. R. 419 (C. A.). On the other hand, an American court has
held that a corporation does not lose its enemy character even if it ceases doing busiuess
in enemy territory by selling its establishment there. Swiss Nat. Ins. Co, v. Miller,
267 U. S. 42 (1925). This holding seems inconsistent with the separability rule, and
where this rule is applied the Swiss Insurance case will probably be disregarded.
63. [1916] 2 A. C. 307. While the precise holding in this case was merely that the
corporation's English secretary was not authorized under the by-laws to sue for a cor-
porate debt, the "control" doctrine announced as dictum was widely accepted as the law,
and on this ground this case has excited an extraordinary amount of comment. See
Norem, Determination of Enemy Character of Corporations (1930) 24 Am. J. INT. L.
310, and references cited therein. Much of the criticism is directed against the allegedly
unwise device of "piercing the corporate veil" to discover the controlling interests.
64. Defence (Trading with the Enemy) Regulations, 1940, reg. 3.
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have met with vigorous opposition in this country. American courts have
been reluctant to "pierce the corporate veil", perhaps chiefly to avoid com-
plications in connection with the diversity of citizenship requirement for
federal jurisdiction.65 But now that judicial control over enemy trading has
been superseded in this country, administrative use of the "control" doctrine
in examining Axis-dominated corporations in South America is not likely to
complicate the law relating to federal jurisdiction. A more persuasive objcc-
tion to promulgation of the "control" doctrine as a general regulation-
statutory, judicial, or administrative- is that the facts on control of foreign
corporations are so complex and so difficult to obtain that businessmen would
find it impossible to predict what transactions will be illegal cG Consequently,
although the "control" doctrine made a brief appearance in the early freezing
regulations, 67 the wording of the Treasury Ruling defining enemy nationals
omitted any reference to this doctrine. 8 But the criterion of enemy con-
trol is appropriate to describe the Axis-dominated firms in South America.
And since the Government has more access to the facts of foreign corporate
organization than the ordinary businessman, suspected South American firms
are now investigated, and blacklisted if enemy control is found. Thus, while
the "benefit" and "control" doctrines have not been emphasized in American
trading with the enemy regulations, in fact they have been retained as criteria
to define enemy trade in neutral countries, for the purpose of making out
the blacklist.
The inter-American conference on systems of economic and financial con-
trol which recently met at Washington has recommended to the American
countries, "in order to eliminate from the commercial, agricultural, industrial
and financial life of the American Republics, all influence" of persons and
corporations "acting against the political and economic independence or
security of such Republics . . . whatever their nationality", that the countri,
proceed with "forced transfer or total liquidation" of their "business, prop-
erties and rights." This far-reaching measure, to be carried out "in accord-
ance with the constitutional procedure of each country", makes no specific
reference to compensation. It goes far beyond the restrictiuns imposed by
trading prohibitions, freezing orders or blacklists. It is designed to put any
65. For purposes of federal jurisdiction, there is a conclusive presumption that cor-
porators are citizens of the same state as the corporation. St. Louis & San Francisco
R. R. v. James, 161 U. S. 545 (1896); Fritz Schulz Co. v. Raimes & Co., 16 Mi c. 697,
166 N. Y. Supp. 657 (Sup. Ct. App. Term 1917). Apparently to avoid complications in
this field, the control doctrine was rejected in America in Hamburg-American Line v.
United States, 277 U. S. 138 (1928). A contrary holding would seem possible, c-vcn
on the basis of Listing authority. If an equitable remedy is required, or a matter of
public policy involved, the "veil" may be "pierced." Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United
States, 71 F. (2d) 524 (C. C. P. A. 1934); see, e.g., United States v. Lehigh Valley
R. R., 220 U. S. 257 (1911) (scrutiny of stockholders to determine violation of Hep-
burn Act "commodities clause.").
66. See Dep't of Treasury Release, March 19, 1942, 1 C. C. H. War Law Serv.
119051 (1942).
67. Executive Order No. 83S9, § 11(b), 5 Fm. RaGo. 1400 (Pt. 2, 1940).
68. But in Pub. Circular No. 18, § c, 7 Fm. REG. 2504 (1942), the definition of pr-
sons subject to American jurisdiction is extended to include all persons and organiza-
tions controlled by persons subject to American jurisdiction.
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persons or corporations meeting the vague disqualifications of the recom-
mendation, out of business. 69
The new administrative control over enemy trade in neutral territory by
means of the general license and the blacklist is already developing more
definite and predictable rules for businessmen.70 Now that South America
has been declared a generally licensed trade area,71 trade may continue except
with firms specifically blacklisted. While trade would thus theoretically be
allowed even with an Italian firm which is not blacklisted,1 2 this policy is
particularly designed to assist friendly firms organized under the laws of
countries now overrun by the Axis powers. And when a South American
firm is blacklisted, the Department of Commerce will now help the American
businessman to find another South American customer to continue the
purchases formerly made by the blacklisted concern.73 These attempts to
preserve the normal South American economy are in important part of the
"Good Neighbor" policy. From a broader viewpoint, this attempt to combine
commercial warfare with long-term diplomatic policy is changing traditional
Anglo-American theories of wartime commercial law.74 The former broad
prohibitions have been replaced by a general license to trade in defined areas
with any firm not specifically blacklisted. At the same time criteria have
been developed to define what types of enemy trade in neutral territory should
be blacklisted. The success of the present liberal South American policy will
determine whether it will be extended to other important neutral trading
areas in the future.
REMOVAL OF DUE PROCESS PROHIBITIONS AGAINST MULTIPLE
STATE INHERITANCE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLES*
ALTHOUGH the United States Supreme Court seemed reluctant to raise
constitutional prohibitions against multiple taxation prior to 1900," later
69. This recommendation is found in Resolution VII of the Final Act of the Confer-
ence. See generally 6 BuLLETix oF DEP'T OF STATE 580, 581 (1942).
70. See note 66 supra.
71. General License No. 53, issued July 17, 1941; amended August 5, 1941, and Oc-
tober 9, 1941. 1 Prentice-Hall Nat. Defense Serv. 35,545.53 (1941). See note 27 supra.
72. Dep't of Treasury Interpretation No. 2, January 23, 1942, 1 Prentice-Hall Nat.
Defense Serv. 50,121 (1942).
73. See N. Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1941, p. 11, col. 1.
74. See LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. 1940) § 101.
* State Tax Comm. of Utah v. Aldrich, 62 Sup. Ct. 1008 (U. S. 1942).
1. Tax laws were invalidated on jurisdictional grounds in six cases only: Hays v.
Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596 (U. S. 1854); North Central R. R, v.
Jackson, 7 Wall. 262 (U. S. 1869) ; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423 (U. S,
1871) ; State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300 (U. S. 1873); Morgan v. Par-
ham, 16 Wall. 471 (U. S. 1873); Dewey v. City of Des Moines, 173 U. S. 193 (1899).
See Bruton, Multi-State Taxation of Intangibles-A Panoramic Sketch (1940) 12 PA.
BAR Ass'N Q. 122. After the turn of the century, the notion that there were constittt-
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decisions held it incompatible with the Fourteenth Amendment for more
than one state to tax the same "economic interest" - at the s-me time.3 Thus,
in First National Bank of Boston v. Maine,4 the Court held the due process
clause a constitutional barrier to multi-state taxation of the transfer at death
of shares of stock. During the past five years, however, the Court's gradual
withdrawal from this position" has implied both a judicial retreat from the
jurisdiction-to-tax field and a disinclination to impose upon the states even
the outlines of a fiscal policy outlawing double taxation.0 The ultimate result
of this change of attitude is State Tax Commissiol of Utah v. Aldrich,* which
holds that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit multiple state in-
tional objections to double taxation of intangibles by states which had command over
them or their owners was specifically rejected in Blackstone v. Miller, 1,8 U. S. 1S9
(1903). Accord: Kidd v. Alabama, 188 LT. S. 730, 732 (1903). But cf. Louisville .&Z
Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385 (1903), which held that real property
could be taxed only at its sitits. However, the Court repeated many times that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not prohibit multiple state taxation of intangibles. HAno1:zG,
DOUBLE TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND INCOME (1933) 20-2, n. 55. For a general bibliog-
raphy on this subject, see Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word (1935) 44 YM.
L. J. 582, n. 2.
2. Stone, J., concurring in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 2S0 U. S. 2434,
215 (1930).
3. In Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905), the con-
flict-of-laws conception of jurisdiction to tax was read into the Fourteenth Amendment.
GooRIcH, Cox-FLicT OF LAWS (1938) 80,82. Here tangible personalty permanently situ-
ated in- State A was held not subject to property taxation in State B, the domicile of the
owner. See note 64 infra. A quarter of a century later, in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930), the Court extended this rationale to inheritance
taxation of intangibles and expressly overruled Blackstone Y. Miller, 188 U. S. 1S9
(1903). Cf. Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 282 LT. S. 1 (1930); Baldvin v.
Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930); Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore Y. Virginia,
280 U. S. 83 (1929). See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
4. 284 U. S. 312 (1932). Cf. Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378 (1933) (Fifth Amend-
ment differentiated from the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to multiple taxation of
the transfer of intangibles at death).
5. After the Court in Lawrence v. State Tax Comm., 2Q6 U. S. 276 (1932), went
back to the benefit-burden theory of taxation (See HARDNG, op. cit. supra note 1 at 22-
25 for development of the theory), "reasonableness" of the burden imposed upon the tax-
payer became the subjective test of the tax's constitutionality. Relying upon tile Law;-
rence case, the Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U. S. 19 (193S), upheld
a Virginia tax on income, although a tax on the same income had already been paid to
New York. Cf. First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234 (1937); New York
ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 308 (1937). Accord: Curry v. MeCanless, 37 U. S.
357, 367 (1939) : "when the taxpayer extends his activities with respect to his intangi-
bles, so as to avail himself of the protection and benefit of the laws of another state, in
such a way as to bring his person or property within the reach of the tax-gatherer there,
the reason for a single place of taxation no longer obtains." Cf. Graves v. Elliott, 307
U. S. 383 (1939). See Traynor, Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court (1940) Pnoc.
OF NAT. TAx Ass'x 27.
6. See Hamilton and Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court (1941)
50 YALE L. J. 1319, 1344; Note (1941) 50 Y.Eax L. J. 900, 903-904.
7. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008 (U. S. 1942).
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heritance taxation of stock shares.8 Apparently, then, the Court has com-
pleted a full cycle in its treatment of state jurisdiction to levy inheritance
taxes on the transfer of intangibles0 owned by non-resident decedents. 10
In the Aldrich case, Utah imposed a tax11 upon the transfer at death of
shares of stock in a Utah corporation, the stock forming part of the estate
of a decedent who, at the time of his death, was domiciled in the State of
New York and held there the certificates representing those shares. For
many years the Utah corporation's stock books, records, and transfer agents
had been in New York. The certificates representing the shares were never
within Utah; yet the shares were claimed by Utah to be within her taxing
jurisdiction. The decedent's administrators successfully attacked the consti-
tutionality of the tax in the Utah courts 12 on the authority of First National
Bank of Boston v. Maine.13 Having granted certiorari 14 "so that the con-
stitutional basis of the Maine case could be re-examined in the light of such
recent decisions as Curry v. McCanless'5 and Graves v. Ellott,10 . . ."
8. For possible extensions of the holding in the Aldrich case, see note 62 infra to-
gether with accompanying text.
9. "Intangibles constitute well above 50% of all property transferred by death
. ... " State Tax Comm. of Utah v. Aldrich, 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1018, n. 18 (U. S.
1942) (hereinafter cited by volume and page).
10. The instant case returns the Court to the position it maintained nearly forty
years ago in Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189 (1903).
11. UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) §§ 80-12-2,-3 provide: "A tax equal to the
sum of the following percentages of the market value of the net estate shall be imposed
upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent, whether a resident or non-resident
of this state; . . ."
"The value of "the gross estate of a decedent shall be determined by including the
value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, within the jurisdiction of
this state and any interest therein, whether tangible or intangible, which shall pass to any
person, in trust or otherwise, by testamentary disposition or by law of inheritance or
succession of this or any state 6r country, . . ." (Cf. provision of New York State
Constitution in note 58 infra). The Utah State Tax Commission made no attempt to hn-
pose an inheritance tax under this statute from the time of the Supreme Court's decision
in First National Bank of Boston v. Maine (see note 13 infra) until Curry v. McCan.
less and Graves v. Elliott (see notes 15 and 16 infra). Communication to YALE LAW
JOURNAL from State Tax Commission of Utah, July 17, 1942.
12. 116 P. (2d) 923 (Utah 1941).
13. In that case, a decedent owning stock in a Maine corporation died domiciled II
Massachusetts. Maine's attempt to levy an inheritance tax on the transfer, after similar
taxes had already been paid in Massachusetts, was held illegal. ". . . the transmission
from the dead to the living of a particular thing, whether corporeal or incorporeal, is an
event which cannot take place in two or more states at one and the same time." 284
U. S. 312, 326 (1932). But see vigorous dissent of Stone, J., on the ground that the
non-resident stockholder in the Maine corporation had benefited by Maine's laws and
should therefore be liable for the Maine tax. Id. at 331.
14. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008-1009.
15. 307 U. S. 357 (1939).
16. 307 U. S. 383 (1939). The Graves and Curry cases declared that securities held
in trust might be subjected to death taxes by both the state where the decedent-settlor




the United States Supreme Court reversed the Utah judgment and upheld
the tax.17
Underlying Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion is the Court's acceptance
of the benefit-burden theory of taxation,' 8 which founds the right of a state
to tax upon "the benefit and protection conferred by the taxing sovereignty.""1
Although this hypothesis is a good philosophic basis upon which to support
a state tax,20 it also increases the probability of multiple taxation. Fearing
this likelihood, the Court, during the late tAventies and early thirties, aban-
doned the benefit-burden theory and used instead the "one thing, one tax"
rule.21 During that period, however, the quid pro quo rationale was urged
by the debtor states, who claimed that the Maine rule, outlawing multi-state
taxation, unfairly discriminated against them in favor of the creditor states.2
Once the benefit-burden theory, clearly irreconcilable with the views expressed
in the Maine case,2 3 was re-adopted by the Court a decade ago, -4 it became
but a matter of time before the "one thing, one tax" rule would be completely
abandoned. Thus, in the Aldrich case, rather than draw any "neat legal
distinctions" between the benefit-burden principles involved and those in recent
cases repudiating the Mahie rule, -5 Mr. justice Douglas chose rather to over-
rule expressly the Mahe decision, disavowing, as it did, the benefit theory.2 6
Albeit the factum of this decision is of undeniable consequence, -" the un-
17. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008-1012.
18. See note 20 infra.
19. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357. 363 (1939).
20. When the principal objective of the Court became the avoidance of niultiple state
taxation, the ma-im mobilia sequuntur fcrsonam was abandoned in favor of the "single
situs" theory. Compare Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194,
205 (1905) with Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 20 U. S. 83, 92
(1929). Exceptions to the "single situs" theory were first induced by the dissent of
Stone, J., in First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 332 (1932) : "Situs
of an intangible for taxing purposes . . . is not a dominating reality but~a convenient
fiction which may be judicially employed or discarded, according to the result desired."
When the desired result was multiple taxation, the benefit-burden doctrine was adopted.
See dissent of Holmes, J., in Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 56, 595 (1930) ; New York
ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U. S. 30S, 313 (1937) ; H.%RIx, op. cit. supra note 1, at
22-25.
21. See note 13 supra.
22. See Nash, Maguire Versus Trefry Reclaihmd (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 281, 314;
Lowndes, Jurisdiction to Tax Debts (1931) 19 GEo. L. J. 427, 436.437.
23. See note 13 supra.
24. See note 5 supra.
25. See Graves v. Schmidlapp, 62 Sup. Ct. 870 (U. S. 1942); Wisconsin v. J. C.
Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435 (1940); Illinois Central R. R. v. Minnesota, 309 U. S.
157 (1940); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U. S. 383 (1939); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S.
357 (1939); First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234 (1937).
26. See note 13 supra.
27. Under the Blackstone rule (see note 1 supra), to which the Court has now re-
turned, transfer of the same intangibles is liable to death taxation at the creditor's domi-
cile [Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278 (1902)] ; at the debtor's domicile [Blackstone v. .Mil-
ler, 188 U. S. 189 (1903)]; at the busines situs [New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S.
309 (1899)]; and at the physical situs of the paper [Vheieler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434
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expressed considerations that must have impelled the Court once again to
sanction multiple taxation are of even greater importance. Impliedly, the
decision could have gone the other way.28 Furthermore, perhaps in antici-
pafion of the dissenting justices' objections, 29 the majority acknowledges that
multiple state taxation has a "bad" practical effect, 80 but fears "that resort
to the Fourteenth Amendment as the ill-adapted instrument of tax reform
will . . . create more difficulties than it will remove."81 If constitutional
limitations on state jurisdiction to tax-as imposed by the Maine case-
were to be retained and strictly enforced, it would almost necessarily follow
that the taxing systems of most states would be seriously impaired, that other
and less desirable forms of taxation would be devised by these states, and
that the delicate duty of determining which states should be accorded priority
to levy different kinds of taxes would devolve upon the United States Supreme
Court. It was these considerations that rendered thorough application of
the Mahe rule of doubtful expedience.32 Furthermore, since some courts
will refuse to appoint an executor or administrator for the estate if there
are no assets to be administered within the sovereignty, an improper solution
by the Court to any one of the various double taxation problems would
multiply the opportunities for tax avoidance.3 3 To forestall the possibility
of such undesirable consequences, the Court has now returned the problem
of multiple taxation to the states. If the resulting jurisdictional snarl is to
be unraveled, positive reform in this field of tax law will be needed. "But,"
says the Court, continuing its trend toward judicial abdication in the tax-
jurisdiction realm, "it is not our province to provide it." 4
Mr. justice Frankfurter, concurring,35 "recalls us to first principles" con-
cerning the separation of powers in a federal system. The power of a state
to tax the effective acquisition of membership in a domestic corporation,
"wherever the piece of paper representing such taxable interest may be physi-
cally located," is held never to have been abrogated by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. If the fact that modern corporate enterprise may receive the benefits
of more than one state government, thereby giving to each jurisdiction to
tax, results in difficult fiscal and political problems, these "are inherent in
the nature of our federalism and are part of its price." The courts can in-
validate laws, whose wisdom or expediency is deemed the business of the
political branches of government, "only when compelling considerations leave
(1914)]. See Sachs, The Saqa of Blackstone v. Miller in EssAYs IN POLITICAL SINCm
(1937) 231, 239. In the case of stock held by the decedent in consolidated corporations
incorporated in several states, the likelihood of multiple taxation is increased.
28. Douglas, J., so suggests. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1011.
29. Id. at 1013.
30. But cf. Nash, loc. cit. supra note 22.
31. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1012. [Quoted from dissenting justices' opinion in First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U. S. 334 (1932)].
32. Merrill, supra note 1, at 602, n. 128 and accompanying text.
33. See STIMSON, JURISDICTION AND POWER OF TAXATION (1933) 84-86. For some
of the problems, see note 27 supra.
34. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1012. See Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 900, 903-904.
35. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1012.
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no other choice." 36 How "compelling" these considerations must be in any
particular case before resort is had to invalidation most likely depends upon
the Court's estimate of its competence to deal with the problem as compared
with that of the legislative branch.3 7
Whereas both the majority and concurring opinions clearly take a long-
term view, i.e., that the "bad" effects of the instant case will hasten much-
needed positive tax reform, the dissent3 8 concerns itself with the immediate
economic impact on states and taxpayers of the Court's unequivocal return
to multiple inheritance taxation of the transfer at death of stock shares.
Attacking the majority opinion on the doctrinal level first, Mr. Justice Jackson
ascribes a "fictional basis" to the theory of benefits and protectionsA0 Ad-
mittedly, an inheritance tax is a tax upon the exercise of the privilege to
succeed to property upon the owner's death.a0 Thus, in the instant case it
was argued 4 ' that a successful transmission to the legatees of the decedent's
corporate interests was contingent not upon any law of Utah but upon the
laws of the decedent's domicile, which conferred the privilege of succession.
Accordingly, the dissenting justices claim that the benefits, if any, conferred
upon the taxpayer by the State of Utah are negligible in proportion to the
tax burden imposed.4 Concerning themselves next with an analysis of the
ultimate incidence of the tax,43 Justices Jackson and Roberts concluded that
the subjection of intangible property to more sources of taxation than other
forms of wealth prejudices its relation to other investments, with consequent
36. Ibid. See also separate opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Newark Fire Ins. Co. V.
State Board of Tax Appeals, 307 U. S. 313, 323-324 (1939): "Wise tax policy is one
thing; constitutional prohibition quite another. The task of devising means for distribut-
ing the burden of taxation equitably . . . is peculiarly a phase of empirical legislation.
It belongs to that range of the experimental activities of government vhich should not
be constrained by rigid and artificial legal concepts."
37. Hamilton and Braden, loc. cit. supra note 6.
38. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1013.
39. Id. at 1015.
40. Pratt, J., concurring in Aldrich v. State Tax Comm., 116 P. (2d) 923, 925
(Utah 1941).
41. Ibid. See also Nash, supra note 22, at 300.
42. Since Utah in 1897 issued a charter to the Union Pacific Railroad, which had
been created in 1862 by Congress, and since the Railroad issued stock to a non-resident,
"which changed hands at his death, which required a transfer on the corporation's bo!:s,
which transfer was permitted by Utah law, . . . Utah is permitted to tax the fril ahteic
of each share of Union Pacific stock passing by death . . ." And all this despite the
fact that Union Pacific stock derives its value from the Railroad's operation in inter-
state commerce, a "privilege which comes from the United States and one which Utah
does not give or protect and could not deny." 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1014-1016.
43. Because the State of New York has written into its Constitution provisions
renouncing a tax such as is involved here (see note 58 infra), "te practical issue under-
lying this case is not whether the (decedent's) estate shall pay or avoid a transfer tax.
The issue is whether Utah or New York will collect the tax." 62 Sup. Ct. 1003, 1016.
If, however, New York had no such provisions in its Constitution or no reciprocity pro-
visions in its statutes (see notes 57 and 58 infra), the decedent's estate would be con-
pelled to pay taxes twice--both in New York and Utah.
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detriment to the nation's largely corporate economy ;44 that the burdens im-
posed by multiple state taxation are "unequal and capricious and in inverse
order to the ability of the estate to pay" ;45 and that the instant decision may
lead to federal invasion of the death tax field and to federal incorporation of
large scale enterprises.40 But what the dissenters fear most, apparently, is
that the Court's opinion will "intensify the already unwholesome conflict and
friction between the states of the Union in competitive exploitation of in-
tangible property." Instead of withdrawing from this jurisdictional snarl, the
Court is urged to help out with "all that it has of wisdom and power." 47
Of course, one may question the reasonableness of the Court's announcing
a decision with admittedly "bad" immediate effects so as, it is hoped, to
precipitate positive tax reform. Concededly, a conflict is here created between
chartering and domiciliary states, but this must not be viewed in isolation.
When two or more states claim domicile of the decedent, further conflicts
over jurisdiction to tax the transfer at death of intangibles can arise. It has
been impliedly held by the Court that one man can be legally domiciled in
more than one state.48 Thus, even if the Maine rule, allowing only the
domiciliary state to tax, were to continue in effect, there would still remain
the possibility of double taxation. 49 A further opportunity for multiple inheri-
tance taxation of intangibles exists, even under the Maine rule, when there
is a difference between the state of domicile of the decedent and the state
in which his share; of corporate stock have their business' situs.50 It was to
alleviate all these conAicts of tax jurisdictions and equitably to settle the tax
claims of the chartering and domiciliary states that the Court in the instant
case impliedly invited positive tax reform, which it itself cannot bring about.6'
44. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1017. The cautious investor, however, can reduce the risk of
multiple taxation by avoiding huge investment in stock of a corporation in a state which
has no reciprocity statutes on its books. See notes 57 and 58 infra.
45. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1018-1019. Jackson, J., argues that the wealthy will find eva-
sion devices, while the many small stockholders will not-because of the expense of
professional counsel. Id. at 1019. See Sachs, supra note 27, at 259-265.
46. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1019. Congress enacted an estate tax [44 STAT. 9, 69-70 (1926),
26 U. S. C. A. §§810, 811 (1940)), which was sustained in Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S.
12 (1927).
47. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1013-1014, 1016.
48. Thereby subjecting his estate to two or more domiciliary taxes. In re Dorrance's
Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932), cert. denicd sub norn. Dorrance v. Pennsyl-
vania, 287 U. S. 660 (1933), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 617 (1933). Cf. Texas v. Florida,
306 U. S. 398 (1939), 39 COL. L. Ray. 1017.
49. Attempts to remedy this double-domiciliary-tax situation have so far failed. Sea
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U. S. 292, 299 (1937).
50. In Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 213 (1930), the
Court expressly left open the possibility of double taxation where intangibles acquired
a "business situs". "The usual example is a money-lending business carried on within
a state with capital belonging to a nonresident." Sachs, supra note 27, at 254-255. dccord:
New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309 (1899). See GoonRIn, op. cit. supra note 3, at
96-106.
51. "... even if it were possible to make the needed adjustments in the fiscal rela-
tions of the States to one another and to the federal government through the process of
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If the problem of multiple taxation is not alleviated by the individual tax-
payer's restriction of his multi-state activities, there are a number of positive
remedies for the resulting tangle: (1) Instead of allowing conflicting tax
jurisdictions to fight it out, the death tax could be assessed by a federal
clearing house, whereupon a proper part of the national yield would be dis-
tributed among the states.52 (2) All the states could, despite their conflicting
interests, adopt a uniform death tax law which would give intangibles a
situs in that jurisdiction which had primary control over their transfer.ra
(3) The states could agree through compact or legislation to levy only a
flat, low rate tax on nonresident decedents. 4 (4) The federal courts could,
sacrificing equity for the sake of simplicity, arbitrarily delimit the spheres of
action of the several statesYn5 (5) States could cooperatively permit estates
within their respective taxing jurisdictions to credit against domiciliary taxes
any amounts paid to non-domiciliary states.o (6) A system of reciprocity
legislation could be put into operation, whereby State A would agree not to
tax the transfer of stock of a State A corporation owned by a decedent resi-
dent in State B at time of his death, if State B would agree to a similar
promise in return.57 Such a plan, in deference to the domiciliary state, would
entirely preclude non-domiciliary taxation of the transfer at death of in-
tangibles, over which the non-domiciliary state admittedly has jurisdiction.
In the past, reciprocal legislation has been the most widely adopted solution
to the multiple state taxation problem. 5 Now that the Court has returned
this problem to the states, it seems more than likely that they will resort
once again to reciprocity legislation, at least until some positive federal action
is taken in this field.0 9 If so, existing reciprocity statutes should be carefully
episodic litigation-which to me seems most ill-adapted for devising fiscal policies-it is
enough that our Constitutional system denies such a function to this Court." Frankfurter,
J., concurring. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1013.
52. Such a plan might stipulate "that payment of a share of the fund be made only
to those states which abolished their ownm estate or inheritance taxes, their income taxes,
and their property taxes on intangibles." Rodell, A Primer on Interstate Taxation3
(1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1166, 1181-1185. See SELIGMZIAN, EssAYs Im TATxoN. (9th ed.
1921) 116; cf. Graves, Influence of Congressional Legislation on Legislation in te States
(193S) 23 IowA L. REV. 519, 528. The three powers Congress could use to conciliate
state revenue needs with those of an interstate economy are the interstate commerce,
taxing, and spending powers. See Hellerstein and Hennefeld, Stlate Taxation in a Na-
tional Economy (1941) 54 ILARv. L. REv. 949, 963-976.
53. See (1911) Paoc. OF NAT. TAx Ass':N 58-59.
54. See (1921) PRoc. OF NAT. TAX Ass'x 505; Brady, Death Taxes-Flat Rates and
Reciprocity (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 309.
55. See Oakes, Development of American State Death Taxes (1941) 26 low', L
Rnv. 451, 472; Nash, supra note 22, at 322.
56. See Note (1941) 26 IowA L. REV. 694, 708.
57. Id. at 695-697.
58. "The zenith of the reciprocity movement was reached in 1930, when 37 states
had reciprocal exemption statutes." Id. at 695. New York State even wrote into its Con-
stitution in 1938 a provision that intangibles ". . . shall be deemed to be located at the
domicile of the owner for purposes of taxation, . . ." N. Y. CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 3.
59. See SHour, FAcING THE T,%x PRO1L3LM (Twentieth Century Fund, 1937) c. 24.
But note that Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1 (1939), detracts from the efficacy
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overhauled in the direction of uniformity among the states,60 and non-
reciprocity states should be urged to conform.
But even before positive tax reform is realized, the Court may find it neces-
sary to reverse its tendency toward self-abnegation in the jurisdiction-to-tax
field. State tax laws with no practical or economic justifications may be forth-
coming, and judicial limitations on arbitrary multiple state taxation will
doubtless have to be drawn.01 The instant case may be limited to corporate
stock only, or, as is more likely, its rationale may be extended to other forms
of intangible property. 2 And since the Court has at times strongly declared
the similarity between intangible and tangible property,0 3 the question is
opened whether its decisions "as to taxation of tangible property are not due
to be overhauled." 0 4 It is in answering these questions that the tax law of
tomorrow will develop. It is in anticipation of the answers that positive
tax reform of today should be framed.
VACATION BY APPELLATE COURTS OF ORDERS CONCERNING
NON-APPEALING PARTIES *
A VAST and necessary body of procedure limits the resort to appellate
courts, and, by a rule generally adhered to, review on the merits will be
denied where the proper parties are not before the court. It has been held
that no one can appeal who was not a party to the judgment below, or at
least privy to it, as shown by the record.' Review could not be had by a
of reciprocal legislation because the Court there held that one state is powerless to en-
force the reciprocal exemption statute of another state.
60. See Note (1941) 26 IOWA L. REv. 694, 708.
61. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1020-1021.
62. Prediction of Jackson, J., id. at 1021. The taxing power of the chartering or
issuing state can be extended: (1) to corporate bonds and bonds of states and miuniel-
palities [by overruling Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. 'Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930)] ;
(2) to bank credits for cash deposited [by overruling Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U, S.
586 (1930)]; and (3) to choses in action [by overruling Beidler v. South Carolina Tax
Comm., 282 U. S. 1 (1930)].
63. See, e.g., Blackstone v. 'Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 205 (1903) : "The practical simi-
larity [between a bank deposit and actual coin in the pocket] more or less has obliter-
ated the legal difference."
64. 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1021. If the implication here is that tangible property may
some day be subjected to multiple taxation, it is not clear by what rationale this result
will be achieved. For more than a third of a century now [since Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905)], it has been settled law that tangible
property permanently !ocated outside the owner's state of domicile is subject to prop-
erty taxation only by the state of situs. Inheritance taxation of tangible personalty situ-
ated outside the state of decedent's domicile is likewise forbidden. See Frick v. Penn-
sylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
* In re Barnett, 124 F. (2d) 1005 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
1. Louisiana v. Jack, 244 U. S. 397 (1917); Ex parte Leaf Tobacco Board of
Trade, 222 U. S. 578 (1911) ; Bayard v. Lombard, 9 How. 530 (U. S. 1850).
litigant of a judgment or error wholly in his favor.2 Courts have not usually
disturbed judgments in the interest of defendants in error not assigning cross
errors or appellees not taking cross appeals. 3 It has been held that review
may not be made where the court below has "failed to make an essential
finding and the record on review is insufficient to provide the basis for a
final determination. . .. "4 Frequently stated, as well, is the rule that an
objection not specified by the assignment of error need not be considered,
nor will an objection not referred to by the court below or pursued in argu-
ment or brief of counsel.5
One of the most firmly established of these limitations has been that an
appellate court could not reverse or modify in favor of a non-appealing party.0
In In re Barnett7 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to
apply this rule, holding that, where it is necessary in the interests of expedi-
ency and justice, an appellate court may extend its order to include the rights
of parties not formally named in the appeal but affected by the controversyS
The facts of the case must be stated at some length. In 1935, Cecelia
Barnett's father willed her 15%o of his residuary estate, and the following
year, in consideration of $5,000 paid her by her father, she executed an
assignment to her mother of all her present and future rights to her father's
estate. The day before her father's death, in 1940, Cecelia Barnett was adjudi-
cated a bankrupt, and there then arose the issue of whether the property
should go to the mother under the assignment, or should pass to the trustee
2. Houchin Sales Co. v. Angert, 11 F. (2d) 115 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; see Harding
v. Federal Nat. Bank, 31 F. (2d) 914, 918 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929).
3. United States v. Black-feather, 155 U. S. 10 (1S94); First Methodist Epicopal
Church of Pasco v. Barr, 123 Wash. 425, 212 P. 546 (1923). For an e.xposition of the
undesirability of such a result, see Comment (1931) 20 C.LiF. L. REV. 70, 75. An excep-
tion, however, has invariably been made where the judgment below is fatally defective
for lack of jurisdiction. In such a case the respondent is not precluded from attacling
the judgment on that ground. 'Mattingly v. Northwestern Virginia R. R., 158 U. S. 53
(1895).
4. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U. S. 200, 206 (1935) [quot-
ing from Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123 (1935)]. But in that case the court held that
the proper procedure is to remand the case to the court below for further hearings. And
where there has been an exceptional situation, plain error, although not assigned, vill La
noted by the court. Trapp v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.. 70 F. (2d) 976, 931 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 596 (1934) ; see State v. City of Albuquerque, 31
N. 'M. 576, 249 Pac. 242 (1926).
5. See W, agner-Taylor Co. v. Spinelli, 295 Pa. 455, 458, 145 Ad. 505, 507 (1929).
6. John Brickell Co. v. Sutro, 11 Cal. App. 460, 105 P. 949 (F39); see Elmer
Co. v. Kemp, 67 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); Lacoe v. Wolf, 218 Cal. 167, 173,
21 P. (2d) 555, 557 (1933); Rollins v. Gould, 244 Mass. 270, 138 N. E. 815 (1923). The
dissent of Judge Hand was directed principally at the majority's infraction of this rule.
See In re Barnett, 124 F. (2d) 1005, 1014 (C. C. . 2d, 1942). See note 3 supra for an
analogous situation.
7. 124 F. (2d) 1005 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) (hereinafter cited by volume and page).
8. Quoting Manson, the Court said, "We should no longer look upon a lawsuit as if
it were 'in the nature of a cock-fight,' so that 'the litigant who wishes to succeed must
try and get an advocate who is a game bird with the best pluck and the sharpest spurs.'"
124 F. (2d) 1005, 1010. See 6 WIGmoRE, EvIwscn (3d ed. 1940) 374-376.
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in bankruptcy. In pursuing his claim the latter did not limit himself to an
action against the mother to have the 1936 assignment held invalid, but also
petitioned for an order directing the bankrupt to assign all interest in her
father's estate to the trustee, free of the claims of the mother. The referee
held the 1936 assignment valid as against the trustee. The District Court
reversed, granting the requested order. From this decision the bankrupt was
the only appellant. Thus the Circuit Court was forced to consider the case
in the absence of the real party in interest, i.e., the mother. The majority of
the Court, however, in holding the assignment valid as against the trustee in
bankruptcy,9 reversed the District Court as to both the bankrupt and the
mother. 10
It was to the majority's determination of an issue "on behalf of a party
who has not appealed at all"" that Judge Learned Hand directed his criticism.
Error alone in the court below, he contended in his dissenting opinion, should
not be the foundation for this action. The bar is not insensible to the function
of the right of appeal, and "it is precisely to raise -such questions that the
right of appeal is provided."'
2
Although Judge Hand's criticism of this unusual determination appears to
be well taken, a thoroughly anomalous situation would have resulted had the
Circuit Court reached its conclusion as to the daughter without a determin-
ation of the mother's rights. Time for appeal had run with respect to the
District Court's adjudication of the mother's interest in the 1936 assignment.
If, then, the Circuit Court had merely reversed the District Court's order
that the daughter assign her interest in her father's estate to the trustee, the
9. The New York rule, which was applied, has long been that the assignment of all
expectancy is enforceable in equity as against a trustee in bankruptcy. In re Cornell's
Will, 170 Misc. 638, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 162 (Surr. Ct. 1939); In re Eisner's Will, 129
Misc. 106, 221 N. Y. Supp. 598 (Surr. Ct. 1926); Stover v. Eycleshimer, 3 Keys 620
(N. Y. 1867). Contra: In re Zimmerman's Will, 104 Misc, 516, 172 N. Y. Supp. 80
(Surr. Ct. 1918). This has now won general acceptance. Bridge v. Kedon, 163 Cal. 493,
126 Pac. 149 (1912) ; Dumont v. McDougal, 200 Ill. App. 583 (1916) ; Hale v. Hollon,
90 Tex. 427, 39 S. W. 287 (1897) ; 4 PoMEaRoy, EiuITY JURISPRUDENCZ (5th ed. 1941)
§§ 1271, 1291. Contra: Gannon v. Graham, 211 Iowa 516, 231 N. W. 675 (1930). A dis-
tinction is made between an expectancy and after-acquired property, with the latter uni-
versally held unassignable as against creditors and trustees in bankruptcy. Okin v. Isaac
Goldman Co., 79 F. (2d) 317 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial
Factors Corp., 68 F. (2d) 864 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). As in the instant case, a legacy has
more often been termed an expectancy than after-acquired property, and is therefore as-
signable. Cohalan v. Parker, 138 App. Div. 849, 123 N. Y. Supp. 343 (1st Dep't 1910).
10. From the fact that the attorney for the bankrupt signed his appeal brief as at-
torney for both the bankrupt and her mother, Judge Frank concluded that those parties
intended and believed that the rights of the mother were before the Circuit Court. See
124 F. (2d) 1005, 1007.
11. Not only was there no appeal, but the assignment issue, contested in the court
below, was abandoned by counsel for the bankrupt who, on appeal, rested his case upon
an entirely new issue-that by means of the consideration paid by the bankrupt to her
father there had been an ademption. Since the appellee had contended that the ademption
issue should be excluded, and that only the original theory was open for consideration,
the majority felt justified in deciding the case solely upon the ground originally argued,
though abandoned, by counsel for appellant. 124 F. (2d) 1005, 1007.
12. 124 F. (2d) 1005, 1014.
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latter would still retain his right to the disputed property because the assign-
- ment requested of the daughter by the trustee was a mere formality, the
adjudication of the mother's right in the assignment being decisive. Therefore
two contradictory determinations of the substantive lawv involved in this case
would be made, both controlling as to the respective parties, yet with the
lower court's decision making effective disposition of the substantive matter.
If the Circuit Court's only concern were to avoid this embarrassing
consequence, there would be little justification for the decision in the instant
case. The Circuit Court, realizing the empty formalism of any determination
they could make as to the daughter's rights, might have dismissed the bank-
rupt's appeal on the ground that she had no standing before the Court. 1
judge Hand had contended that the bankrupt no longer had any basis for
her appeal since counsel for the trustee was willing to dismiss the action
against the daughter upon realizing that this unnecessary action was the tech-
nical foundation for a consideration of the mother's rights.14 The appeal
would therefore be moot as to the only part), before the Court. But the
majority held that Rule 41a(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
giving the Court discretionary powers as to dismissal,15 was applicable - and
retained the appeal to decide the case on its merits. Dismissal would have
concluded the issue against the mother - a result which the Circuit Court
found intolerable.
The Circuit Court cited in justification of its decision the Supreme Court's
view that an appellate court has broad power "not only to correct errors of
law in the judgment under review, but also to make such disposition of the
case as justice requires." ' It maintained that as a court of equity it could
conclude all of the aspects of a case once jurisdiction of it was obtained, so
that an equitable result could be reached.' 7 In stating that procedural mistakes
13. See dissent of Hand, C. J., 124 F. (2d) 1005, 1013.
14. Although the daughter had no interest in the property itself, she could properly
appeal from an order directing her to do an unnecessary or illegal act. The traditional
prescription has been that the injured or "aggrieved" must justify his appeal by show-
ing some denial of a personal or property right by the order of the court below. Even
the slightest is often enough. United States v. Armijo, 5 Wall. 444 (U. S. 18(5).
15. "Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule [providing
for voluntary dismissal by plaintiff at any time before service of the answer, or upon
showing consent to dismiss by all parties], an action shall not be dismissed at the plain-
tiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the
court deems proper."
16. Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 600, 607 (1935) [quoted and acted upon in State
Tax Comm. v. Van Cott, 306 U. S. 511, 515 (1939); State of Minnesota v. National
Tea Co., 309 U. S. 551, 555 (1940)].
17. The Court considered the possibilities of using a method alternative to the one
chosen here, based upon the action taken in Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U. S.
82 (1922). There a rehearing was granted as to the validity of a patent after the Supreme
Court, in reviewing a decree in another suit brought in another circuit, determined the
same issue contrary to the decision taken by the district court. The Supreme Court, in
sustaining the action taken by the district court, held that the procedure followed in
that case was sufficient for the purpose, although the circuit court had held that "on
the facts presented, a bill of review could not be maintained." The earlier decree of the
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as to appellate proceedings should not defeat justice, the Court has broadened
the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the process of
appeal - on the theory that "procedural rules are but . . . means to the
enforcement of substantive justice."' 8 Support for this position is found in
Rules 73a and 75d, which give federal courts license to search the record for
all helpful arguments on the merits by eliminating the need for assignments
of error and their attendant limitations upon the scope of appellate review.lD
It might be said that the rationale in this case runs against the policy which
underlies res judicata. 20 That doctrine has long forbidden the litigation of
an issue which could have been but was not raised in former ptoceedings. 2t
This prohibition has been recently applied even where the issue in question
involved jurisdiction over the subject matter- a field in which there had
been doubt as to whether the rule would apply. 22 But the policy to end dis-
putes and ease the administrative burden of the courts, thus authoritatively
district court holding the patent invalid was deemed to be not final for there was still
another issue concerning that same patent still before the district court-a charge of
unfair competition. In view of this situation, the Supreme Court held that "it was the
duty of the District Court to grant rehearing and to vacate the earlier decree, in order
to avoid, where possible, the anomoly of discrepant legal rulings as to different parties
concerning an identical subject matter." However, the Court in the instant case, ex-
pressed its hesitancy concerning the applicability of this procedure to In re Barnett,
since more than "six months had elapsed since the order was entered in the instant case;
Rule 60(b) sets a limit of six months for reopening of orders except by bill of review;
and the Grier Bros. case leaves some doubt whether a bill of review would lie here."
124 F. (2d) 1005, 1011-1012.
18. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by The New Federal Rules (1939) 15
TENN. L. REV. 551.
19. Although originally the Rules had no application to bankruptcy proceedings
under Rule 81 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they now apply to such proceed-
ings. General Orders in Bankruptcy 36 and 37, 305 U. S. 698 (1939). See llsen and
Hone, Federal Appellate Practice a*s Affected by the New Rules of Civil Procedure
(1939) 24 MINN. L. REV. 1. Starting from the premise that an appeal was an entirely
new suit, former federal practice. held all errors not assigned to be waived by the ap-
pellant. This is still the rule in the majority of the states, but at least three have abol-
ished the requirement. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 2773; ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-
Hurd, 1934) c. 110, §§ 259-36, 259-39; IowA CODE (Reichmann, 1939) § 12869.
20. See Boskey and Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Tcrin,
1939 (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 1006, for an excellent discussion of these trends.
21. See Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 (1876) ; Moschzisker, Res Judicata
(1929) 38 YALE L. J. 299; CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1940)
c. 16; ARNOLD AND JAMES, CASES ON TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND APPEALs (1936) 138-192,
22. Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371 (1940),
49 YALE L. J. 959; see Boskey and Braucher, supra note 20, at 1008. "The obstacle of sup-
posed unwaivability which had prevented the extension of res judicata to subject matter
jurisdiction was first prominently spanned in American Surety Company v. Baldwiu
[287 U. S. 156 (1932)], followed by Stoll v. Gottlieb [305 U. S. 165 (1938) -- cases in
which the original court had made a specific though incorrect finding of its own power
to judge." (1940) 49 YALE L. 3. 959, 960. See also Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co.,
308 U. S. 66 (1939) ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938). But cf. Kalb v. Feuersteln,
308 U. S. 433 (1940) (statute creating an exception to the principle opposed to collateral
attack) ; see Boskey and Braucher, supra note 20, at 1016-1030.
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sanctioned, does not have the same force in the present case. To be sure,
if the mother's claim is not considered, the litigation is ended since the time
for an appeal from the lower court's determination of her rights has run.2
But arguments based upon the greater administrative burden involved in
adopting the procedure taken by the court in the instant case are not justi-
fied. In the collateral attack an entirely new proceeding is involved for which
there is a wide choice of forums and which may be brought over a relatively
long period of time. Here, on the other hand, an appeal must have been duly
taken by at least one party, and there is only one court to which it may
properly be taken. And in cases such as the one involved here there almost
invariably will be litigation upon the very issue which is the concern of the
non-appealing party. Since limitations on appellate jurisdiction tend to sacri-
fice a full examination of the substantive merits to expediency and simplicity
of administration, they should not be insisted on in cases where the sacrifice
is great and the administrative gain is slight.
Implicit in any objection that might be made to the instant case is the
fear, perhaps justified by the unnecessarily broad language of the majority
opinion, that it will operate as an unfortunate precedent. Circumstances may
arise where one of the appealing parties could legitimately claim that he was
surprised and unprepared to meet a proposed order by an appellate court
on behalf of a party not joined in the appeal,2 4 even though that could hardly
be contended here.2 5 Where there is surprise, adequate protection can be
afforded the appellant by means ordinarily used. It is probable, therefore,
that the Barnett case will serve as a precedent only in those situations where
an unusual combination of circumstances would produce an inequitable result
and embarrassment to the court, and where a liberal treatment of the rules
of appellate procedure would not prejudice the opposing party's substantive
rights.
23. Assuming that the time for appeal had not run as to the mother's right in the
1936 assignment the course followed here would have notably curtailed litigation. A con-
sideration of the law involved in the suit against the daughter would not have to h
made again when the substantive question-as to the 1936 assignment-was brought up
later on the mother's appeal. But this would not be a typical situation, since time for
appeal in the federal courts ordinarily is 3 months. 43 ST.AT. 940 (1925), 2, U. S. C. § 230
(1940). See Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which "e.%pressly pro-
vides that the court may not enlarge the period for taking an appeal . . ." from a dis-
trict court to a circuit court of appeals. 1 MOORE, FD.L Pm.\cricE (1933) 414. in
bankruptcy proceedings the time for appeal is limited to only 30 days. 44 STr.T. (i(5
(1926), 11 U. S. C. § 48 (1940).
24. See Luke v. First Nat. Bank, 224 Iowa 847, 850. 278 N. W. 230, 2,33 (193X).
25. The trustee could not have claimed to be surprised by an adjudication in favor
of the mother since he believed that the interests of all three parties were enmeshed in
the single question of the validity of the assignment. Not until Hand, C. J., suggested
in open court that the trustee voluntarily delete the only part of the order uutstanding
against the bankrupt did the attorney for the trustee realize that the bankrupt's interests
were even technically separable from those of her mother. His brief was directed tov'ards
an argument on the merits of the assignment, urging in main that the Circuit Court dis-
regard the ademption issue, since it mas being raised, for the first time on appeal, and
determine whether or not the bankrupt could validly assign an expectancy under the
prevailing New York law.
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